

Northern Spring 1983

SPEAHR¹⁷head

BULLETIN of the SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION OF EAST ASIANS' HUMAN RIGHTS

Feature Issue:

Easterners' Rights: The West's Role

Two essays by:

**Rhoads Murphey (page 4), and
Raymond Gastil and James Seymour, 3**

**A conversation with Chinese dissidents, 30
Review of an important new book from France, 9
Recent Publications, 12
Crossreference, 16**

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

On December 10, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations proclaimed this declaration as "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations."

Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6. Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10. Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11. (1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.

(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Article 12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country,

including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14. (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 15. (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16. (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 17. (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21. (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.

(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23. (1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.

(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.

(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Article 24. Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25. (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26. (1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Article 27. (1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 28. Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Article 29. (1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.

(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

Promoting Democracy

By **RAYMOND GASTIL** and **JAMES SEYMOUR**

The following paper served as the basis for discussion at a conference on the problem of democracy in the PRC and Taiwan, held in New York, 6-7 May 1983. The original title was: "Supporting Democracy in The People's Republic of China and The Republic of China (Taiwan): General Considerations for The Freedom House Conference."

Raymond D. Gastil is Director of the Comparative Survey of Freedom. James D. Seymour is Research Associate at Columbia University's East Asian Institute.

This conference has been called to assist Freedom House in its efforts to defend, expand, and deepen freedom in the world. Freedom is defined in terms of liberal democratic rights: political equality and civil liberty under law. Put another way, freedom is seen as deriving from the right of all people to determine the nature of their own lives, and to live by their own symbols and values. In principle, this applies to nations as well as individuals. "Democracy" implies the absence of oppression from both native and foreign rulers. But tension can arise between the demand for liberal democracy on the one hand, and the interests of both individuals and states on the other. This is especially true when there are overlapping claims to nationhood. Often competing demands have legitimacy. Whatever the claim, let us confine our deliberations to individuals, ethnic groups, and nation states, and avoid the elitist concept of "masses."

Freedom has been given increased importance in recent American foreign policy, through the emphasis on human rights by Congress and the administration of Jimmy Carter. After an

uncertain start, President Reagan appears to be continuing to incorporate human rights into his administration's foreign policy, though the degree, methods, and political focus are different from Carter's. The main thrust in support of freedom has been through increased efforts to combat the expansion of communism. Recently, Washington has made some proposals for the more general promotion of democracy, both by the U.S. government and the private sector.

Whereas the qualitative (if not quantitative) requirements of defense in support of Western freedoms are relatively easy to determine, the requirements of promoting the expansion of freedom (particularly in the most closed societies) are simply not known. Certainly the U.S. government has often been misguided (or at any rate unsuccessful) in its efforts to influence change for the better in such different countries as Chile, Iran, Haiti, Nicaragua, or Poland. Some would say the United States tried too hard, others that the effort was too little. The Philippines, which was once held up as a model of the transfer of democracy, cannot even be influenced to maintain a <CONT'D P. 22>

Scholars, Learned Societies, and the Defense of Human Rights

By RHOADS MURPHEY

This is a shortened and slightly altered version of an address prepared for delivery at a colloquium held March 14-16 at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The author is Professor of Asian History at the University of Michigan, and Executive Secretary of the Association for Asian Studies.

If one can characterize traditional China as a society where intellectuals were supposed to be keepers of the group conscience and models of virtuous behavior, then we who study them, scholars in the China field, may be said, if not to inherit their role, then at least to be especially sensitized to it. We live in a very different world from China, and yet the differences, great as they are, do not negate the universals implicit in the role of intellectuals. Like Confucian scholars, we too enjoy aspects of elite status--and with it some corollary of public duty. More important, as scholars we are supposed to be able to take the long view, to pursue what we call "truth" regardless of the consequences, and to develop a perspective on human affairs based on both broad knowledge and specialized expertise. From such a perspective we should find it easier than do others to perceive the world as one, to see the common features of the human experience as more important than the differences, and to recognize that human strivings are much the same everywhere. This may be particularly true of intellectual

strivings, which can flourish best where the pursuit of "truth" is unhampered by other and antithetical ideological or political pressures.

In any case, as intellectuals we have a particular responsibility for the welfare of fellow scholars, not merely because of guild loyalty but because we of all people should understand the commonality of humankind and also the importance of safeguarding the scholar's freedom to investigate and if necessary to judge society. Finally, we are fortunate enough to live and work where such freedoms exist, can state our convictions on any issues we choose, can criticize authority, and can argue for better paths without fear of repression. For this reason, I believe that we have a heavy additional responsibility, both to use that freedom to confront moral issues, and to speak out in support of less fortunate scholars who are in trouble elsewhere.

Of course, the climate of this freedom permits, and even encourages, the growth of multiple opinions on almost any issue--perhaps especially moral issues. It is proverbially difficult for intellectuals to agree on almost anything. The one position which I find hard to accept (gritting my teeth to be tolerant even if it kills me) is a nil position on moral issues. That, it seems to me, breaks the "dharma" of the scholar. Unfortunately, it is far from uncommon. However obviously true it may be that to take no position is in effect to

support what is (a little like those who choose not to vote or who in other ways leave moral or political decisions to others), it usually does not produce results to argue with such people. Silence is not only irresponsible in the most basic sense--an abdication of the scholar's social duty--but it constitutes a statement in itself, both of unconcern and of implicit acceptance of the status quo. It is perhaps for those unfortunate many who say that learned societies should "take no political position," that Dante reserved the hottest places in hell.

But the matter is really not so simple, and many who take such a view do have their own political or moral convictions and are willing to express them personally. Others may in particular circumstances feel constrained for honorable reasons to keep silent and to avoid acting on their convictions. (There is insufficient space here to sort out the "moral" from "political" questions, so for now I am treating them as interchangeable.) The chief issue is the difficulty of reducing multiple opinions and shades of opinions, along a wide spectrum which may also include nil or silent positions, to a single one in the name of a collectivity, such as the Association for Asian Studies. Virtually all the consequences are bad: the ignoring of all other views at variance with the one which prevailed (something especially upsetting to scholars, as it should be), the watering down of the official statement to attract support through the self-defeating task of reconciling diverse views and producing a meaningless mush as a result, and, sometimes most distressing of all, the fostering of gratuitous conflict among members as different opinions contend in this artificially confined arena. So it is understandable that many believe it better not to try, and hence support a "no political positions" stance.

Of course, it is true that no group statement can hope to reflect faithfully the opinions of some thousands of scholars, most of whom are sticklers for precise meanings and nuances and with their own positions scattered over a wide range. We all have had the trying experience of attempting to work out the wording of a statement which both says what we want to say and also is acceptable to a sufficient number of others, and most of us have, I suspect, also experienced failure or disruptive conflict. When one attempts to deal with a group of thousands, the problems become truly unworkable, especially since such a group cannot really meet together or interact. Majority votes by mail ballot are felt by many not to be an acceptable way out, since such a method ignores what may be substantial minority opinion and yet purports to speak for the organization as a whole. When the questions

addressed are or can be seen as "political" or "moral" (and of course few questions cannot), feelings run high. Moral imperatives are extremely difficult to deal with through a large collectivity, especially one composed of scholars. There is also a practical problem. Learned societies can exist in their present form only if they can maintain their exemption from taxation. By the laws of many countries, the too-free exercise of what may be interpreted as their social responsibility (but which others may regard as lobbying) could lead to loss of tax exemption for them and their benefactors.

What happens when cases involving the persecution of foreign scholars come to the attention of the Association of Asian Studies? In the depths of the cold war or in the surcharged atmosphere of the immediate post-Vietnam war years, they were usually not taken up, at least officially. Political sensitivities were raw and inflamed, and many shied away from anything which might risk further divisive bitterness. (This condition was not peculiar to Asianists, but we were impacted in a special way by the legacy of the wars in China, Korea and Vietnam.) However, I have noticed over the last decade, as elections have altered the composition of the AAS Board of Directors in successive years, that matters which used to be thought highly controversial become less so--and sometimes vice-versa. In 1973, for example, the Board voted overwhelmingly to refuse to circulate to AAS members a referendum on the plight of academic political prisoners in South Vietnam, on the grounds that it was "too political," although it did agree to supply mailing labels at cost for the circulation of a petition on the same subject.

A good example of the more recent change in climate is the case of Syed Husin bin Ali. Hussin was, and now is again, a professor of sociology at the University of Malaya. He was outspoken in print on political issues, directly active in politics, and critical of the Malaysian government. He was jailed in 1975. The authorities later offered to release him from jail and let him have his job back if he would agree not to resume political activity (an offer he refused). Though hardly in a class with the many thousands of prisoners of conscience in gulags and torture chambers around the world, he was then adopted by Amnesty International as a prisoner of conscience.

Thus, Syed Hussin's case also came to the attention of the Southeast Asia Council of the Association for Asian Studies. At its 1980 meeting the Council expressed its concern. This action was approved by the Board of Directors, not only for Hussin by name but for "Southeast Asian scholars whose ability to pursue their

intellectual calling is being limited and constrained by official actions of governments and other authorities." The resolution asked, in the name of the Council and of the AAS, for Husin's speedy release, and it called on other people and groups to take similar stands. Copies of the resolution were sent to the prime minister of Malaysia, the home minister, the University of Malaya, the Malaysian ambassador in Washington, and the US State Department. A few months later Husin was indeed released, and the incident appears to have been closed. (However, a 1979 government directive still prohibits university faculty from engaging in political activity.)

As in so many cases like this, advice was received from official and unofficial sources in Malaysia and in the United States to the effect that our intervention would be unwise. It was said that it would at best be resented as foreign interference in internal matters, and would probably harm Husin's case or would further prejudice the government against him. Those of us who concern ourselves with the plight of persecuted scholars are given the same, doubtless well-intentioned, advice. One cannot pretend to claim that our puny efforts produced Husin's release, but to do or say nothing can accomplish nothing, while the events do suggest that something good may result from speaking out. Julio de Pena Valdez, labor leader and former AI-adopted prisoner in the Dominican Republic, has said: "When the first two hundred letters came, the guards gave me back my clothes. Then the next two hundred letters came and the prison director came to see me. The letters kept coming and coming, three thousand of them...and the president called the prison and told them to let me go."*

I need hardly say that many around the world are not so fortunate, including, alas, many for whom similar outside efforts have been and continue to be made. The Malaysian government, not by any means the worst offender in such matters, still detains (according to the latest AI annual report) about 60 people for the non-violent exercise of their human rights, especially trade unionists, academics, and journalists. About half of the member states of the United Nations hold what Amnesty regards as prisoners of conscience. Less than half have signed the major covenants on human rights. (To our shame, the United States is one of the holdouts.) There are, of course, enormous problems of data, and of definition. All alleged political crimes are not innocent; "terrorists" to some are to others "defenders of freedom,"

*Quoted in Newsweek, 14 Feb., p 54. After being active in the DR trade union movement, de Pena Valdez was jailed in 1971.

and all states must protect themselves and their citizens against civil violence no matter in what cause. Amnesty International goes to great lengths to discover all it can about a case before it adopts the individual as a prisoner of conscience. It would be self-destructive to debase that coin, and prisoners who have used or advocated violence are excluded (by definition). But even after such careful discrimination, estimates of prisoners of conscience are in the many thousands for each of the discouragingly long list of countries. Ill treatment and torture are commonplace.

One knows of no cases where outside pressures have produced bad results for the objects of this help (despite the advice to the contrary), although there are of course many where the results have been nil. Such efforts usually begin in any case only after an individual has been fired, harassed, or denied exit, before being imprisoned, so he or she is already in deep trouble. There is no evidence that outside pressures on behalf of such people have led to a worsening of their situations. One can be sure only that without outside efforts there is no reason to expect an improvement in the general situation. But some governments are more responsive to outside opinion than others.

The Marcos regime in the Philippines may be an example of a government which can be influenced. Especially after the introduction of martial law in 1972, President Marcos rounded up large numbers of dissident intellectuals, among others, and put them in jail. Unfavorable publicity, especially in the United States where he was particularly anxious to curry favor as a "democratic leader," seems to have led him to restore at least the appearance of free expression and to leave most intellectuals free to speak their minds as long as they avoid political action or incitement. What repression still exists, concentrated on labor people and alleged communists, is usually done in secret. Thus Marcos can point to public criticism of him and his regime as evidence of his "democratic" bona fides. People are not permanently denied permission to leave the country, and even foreign critics are invited to conferences in the Philippines--further useful window dressing. Still, many who stray over the line into activism "disappear" or end up in jail, and many refugees do not dare to return. So while the policy is a hypocritical one, it has its benefits and suggests the effectiveness of outside opinion. Pragmatically, if not morally, it is encouraging.

There are some signs that the Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan may be moving in a similar direction. Taiwan is another small country whose government is concerned about

its image abroad. The storm of protest that followed the 1981 murder there of Carnegie-Mellon professor Ch'en Wen-ch'eng gained an admission from the authorities that "the procedures of interrogation...should be studied and improved."* Since then, it has been announced that some cases would be reviewed, that torture allegations would be investigated, and that in civilian cases suspects are to have access to a lawyer. Unfortunately, the latter promise does not apply to martial law cases, where the worst abuses occur. More recently, there has been a wide-spread call within Taiwan for the lifting of martial law. Non-Kuomintang leaders have called for an end to policies limiting publication of newspapers to a few pro-KMT mouthpieces, and to the blacklisting of dissidents abroad. Statements urging an end to martial law in Taiwan have also been made in the US by Senators Kennedy and Pell. Across the Taiwan Strait, the PRC announced about a year ago the release of some 4000 civil and military KMT prisoners, most of the imprisoned since 1949. Perhaps the government on Taiwan will feel it too must release at least some of its political prisoners, if only to avoid being upstaged.

South Korea, likewise anxious about its external image, released its best-known prisoner, Kim Dae-jung, and allowed him to go to the United States, and a few other defendants' sentences have been commuted.

In spite of some gains, Amnesty International, which does the lion's share of work in all such cases around the world, is probably right in adhering to its policy of never claiming "success" when one of its adoptees is released. It is just too hard to establish clear cause-and-effect relationships, and too common for nothing to result from AI's or others' efforts, including political victims still in prison.

Political scientist James Seymour of Columbia University has attempted to rate governments in terms of their degree of compliance with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. His research† demonstrates most of all how extremely difficult such measurement is. There are, expectedly, crippling statistical data problems and an unworkable degree of ambiguity, so much so that Seymour is reluctant to draw any firm conclusions. Although statistics do matter,

*Quoted in Amnesty International 1982 Report, p. 246.

† "Indices of Political Imprisonment," Universal Human Rights, I:1, 1979, pp. 99-102. (For the text of the declaration, see above, page 2.)

China Spring Update

The "China Spring" movement (see review by Mab Huang in our previous issue) has been attracting attention in Hong Kong--mostly favorable.

However, the pro-PRC press there has reacted with acerbity. A "special commentary" by Yuan Ping in Wen Wei Po said of the movement: "We detest its hypocrisy and lament its stupidity." Yuan's theme was basically nationalistic; he emphasized that only under the communists was China able to take her rightful place among nations. The motives of China Spring's founder, Wang Bingzhang, were impuned. "We have the right to suspect Wang's political background and his false use of the words 'democracy' and 'freedom' to carry out sinister tricks." An attempt was made to link him both to the "Gang of Four" and the Kuomintang. Dr. Wang's relations with his secretary were termed a "scandal." <17D22>

Seymour would surely agree that what really matters is the principle, and this is the same whether a country's prisoner-of-conscience population is five or 50,000.

To some minds, it follows from such a principle that if individuals or groups are to intervene from outside in defense of one oppressed person, they must do so for all, in all countries. Apart from the impossibility of this, there is a genuine moral issue involved. Indeed it has been raised repeatedly by AAS members--often as a reason (or pretext?) for their disapproving action in particular cases. We should not try to defend persecuted scholars or harry offending governments, it is said, unless we are willing to do the same for those in the PRC, North Korea, and all other countries under whatever system. Others argue that it is morally unacceptable, and elitist as well, to offer help to persecuted scholars but not to other victims of political repression: labor leaders, politicians, and so on. Both points involve truly disturbing questions, and to my mind there can be no fully satisfactory answer.

Perhaps least unsatisfactory is to try to help wherever and whenever one can, and to worry as little as possible that one can never encompass the entire universe of human troubles, or even a representative sample. It is hard to justify a policy of helping no one because one cannot help everyone. Any relief effort must recognize the dilemma and manage to live with it. It is a lot easier to help some

people than others, and this usually has to do with where they are--hardly a moral issue in itself. At least before 1977, and perhaps at certain periods since, foreign efforts on behalf of persecutees in the PRC were not only almost certain to fail but might well have been counter-productive; nor did we often know more than a tiny fraction of what was happening, and to whom. North Korea, Albania, Kampuchea, and perhaps other states were or are also so closed to most outside contact that we have had neither adequate information about, nor means of trying to help, people imprisoned or harassed because of their opinions. There will always be such disparities among countries, but regret that one can do little or nothing for most victims of oppression is in no way an acceptable substitute for trying to do what is possible for those who can be helped.

The objection that to intervene in support of "elite" scholars, ignoring the plight of other equally genuine but non-academic prisoners, is more difficult to deal with. The most defensible reply to my mind is a purely tactical one: Efforts to help fellow scholars are more feasible for us than efforts on behalf of others. Let our union leaders speak out for persecuted labor people, politicians for politicians, and scholars for scholars. Indeed, there are already occupational groups (such as PEN, and the Committee to Protect Journalists) that do effective work of this sort. It works better at both ends, in marshalling support among the helpers and making a point with offending governments. The latter are more likely to respond to unionists pressing for unionists than to scholars pleading for politicians. Endorsements along guild lines are easier to obtain, and they mean more. This does not resolve the moral dilemma, but it makes it easier to live with. It always leaves scholars and learned societies the option to call to the attention of more appropriate groups problems of oppression of their fellow professional.

Political passions of the post-Vietnam era having cooled, it may be possible for us to address effectively matters pointedly avoided in the past as "too political." I would like to see the learned societies encourage their members individually and jointly to address moral and political questions related to the role of the scholar in a political and often repressive world. This can be done through sessions at annual and regional meetings, and through making a place in their publications for appropriate papers. Such a course also makes it easier for the societies to play a more active role (by whatever mechanisms are practicable and acceptable to their members) in trying to defend their fellow scholars and others who fall afoul

of oppressive governments. There is no likelihood that one-sided political positions would dominate meetings or journals--we are too diverse for that. But members would be confronted with moral issues about which enough people felt sufficient concern to arrange a panel, write an article, circulate a petition, or organize a strategy. Such a development would bring with it some risks of stimulating divisiveness, and it would have to be managed carefully. But diversity of views is a hallmark of academia, and so is the preservation of maximum opportunity for its expression.

Few people would want to see the learned societies politicized or polarized. Apart from the destructiveness of such a move, it would subvert these societies' principal purpose. Nonetheless, we cannot turn a blind eye to moral questions merely in the interests of conflict avoidance. The larger issues justify running some risks. Scholars should accept the social responsibility which comes with their calling, even at some cost to themselves. Indeed, it can be regarded as a basic function of any learned society to promote the critical exchange of diverse views on matters about which a significant number of its members feel a professional concern. If this legitimately includes conflicting views on traditional Confucianism, the moral implications of Han expansionism, or the role of literature in society, why should it not also include other moral questions of our own times? It has been mainly the social scientists who have opposed what they label "political" statements or actions by learned societies. The humanists, like the physical and mathematical scientists, seem to have been more responsive to what they see as moral imperatives and less troubled by the predictable lack of agreement on which issues are most important, which side represents virtue, and what will the Internal Revenue Service say.

The moral dimension of politics is truly too important to be left to the politicians. Scholars today have many of the same responsibilities which the Confucian way laid down. If this is arrogance, we must confess that we are indeed an elite, but that the awareness, sensitivity and compassion which come from scholarship give us a special responsibility and a perspective from which to speak to the shortcomings of society. Let us be content to accept such a function, to accept the risks which may come with it, and thus to place ourselves in the Confucian tradition. This is a tradition for our times as much as for any other. As one who should know, Thomas Mann, has put it: "In our time, the destiny of man presents its meaning in political terms." x

Springless Soup

Un Bol de nids d'hirondelles ne fait pas le printemps de Pékin: Documents réunis et traduits du Chinois par Huang San, Angel Pino & Lionel Epstein. Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1980. 439 p. Notes, photographs. FF 120.

Reviewed by CORINNA-BARBARA FRANCIS

'Un Bol de nids d'hirondelles' provides an in-depth view of a few selected aspects of China's democracy movement of 1978-79. It is not a comprehensive presentation, which can be found elsewhere. This volume would therefore best serve those who already have a general knowledge of the movement and are looking for greater detail on the particular writer and journals presented here--not only the well-known Wei Jingsheng, but also Ren Wandong and the League for Human Rights, and Fu Yuehua and the "petitioners" in Peking. The greater portion of the documents, 250 out of 350 pages, is devoted to writings by and about Wei Jingsheng and his journal Exploration. A lengthy introduction by Huang San provides detailed background of the rise and fall of the movement, its connections with intra-Party factional struggles, the broad theoretical and practical concerns of the movement, as well as a run-down on the different organizations and journals and their most important activists.

In the preface to the book the editors express the concern that the democracy movement, which burst forth in late 1978 and was rapidly paralyzed by the "cold winds of March," might pass without a trace. One of their hopes in putting together the selection was to prevent history from effacing all memory of the movement and its participants. As they eloquently state in the preface: "It is true that our comrades have neither celebrity nor renown. They are but the little people that societies crush every day. Their writings appear monotone; they are but a single cry that is repeated from page to page. But it is the cry that from Athens to Haiti, from the Commune to Cronstadt, civilizations send back and forth to each other like an echo that cannot die." The editors are only too aware of the fragility of the movement for democracy in China and of the battle it has yet to face.

It is in this context that we must understand the title of the book, a pun on the expression "a single sparrow does not make spring," as pointing to the abortion of the movement and the fact that the activities of 1978-79 can only be considered the very first step--the first sparrow. (It is also a pun on "bird's-nest soup.") Yet while sensitive to the limitations of the movement, they simultaneously display unusual optimism concerning the long-term prospects for democracy and human rights in China.

The greater part of the book is devoted to documents about Wei Jingsheng and "Exploration," the journal of which Wei was a main founder. They include Wei's major articles including "The Fifth Modernization;" numerous lesser-known articles by him which are difficult to find elsewhere; articles from Exploration describing the founding of the journal and Wei's role in it; personal descriptions of Wei which provide insights into his character; as well as a series of articles from Exploration which give a good sense of the variety of the journal's political concerns and goals.

While reading the documents it should be kept in mind that although Wei Jingsheng gained the greatest visibility both within China and the West, he held views which were actually atypical of the democracy movement as a whole, and appears to have been considered extreme by other Chinese. Wei Jingsheng's courage (as demonstrated at his trial*) was widely admired, but his political views were supported by an extremely small minority. Even within the Exploration group, which represented the most militant sector of the movement, Wei held more extreme views than his colleagues like Yang Guang and Lu Lin. Considering the space devoted to Wei and his writing, the introduction might have made his position within the movement somewhat clearer.

Notwithstanding the criticism of Wei's "idealism" and "naiveté," his writings are among the most intellectually engaging as well as politically daring and colorful. The underlying theme in his thought is that China will never be able to modernize its economy, science and technology, and defense--Deng Xiaoping's Four Modernizations--until the people and the socio-political system are modernized--what he dubs the "fifth modernization." That is to say that the fifth modernization is a precondition of the four modernizations, not their result. The idea that democracy will develop naturally once the forces of production are developed is rejected.

What would constitute a modernized order? The single most important component of a modern demo-

*See transcript, SPEAHRhead 10-11.

cratic social system, in Wei's view, are individual freedom and rights; these would enable people's creativity to flourish, and human energy to develop. The most important difference between democracies and totalitarian societies is that the former seek harmony with the individual, while the latter seek to suppress individuality. While the rule of law, and respect for the Constitution are essential ingredients in a democratic society, they are seen as insufficient.

Essential to "true democracy" is the "right of the people to choose representatives who will serve their will and interests." Furthermore, "the people must also have the power to replace their representatives any time, so that these representatives cannot go on deceiving others in the name of the people" (p. 164). Free and meaningful elections, and the right of recall, are necessary to express of the will of the people.

Such attitudes were shared by the democracy activists in general. But Wei's views diverge radically from his comrades in his appraisals of Marxism-Leninism and of socialist systems. While he does not condemn Marxism in principle, he says that all existing Marxist-Leninist systems are the most politically despotic and economically backward. "Socialism," Wei notes, means different things to different people. To some it represents an ideal type of social system, to others it represents totalitarian political systems. Wei himself sees Chinese socialism as the logical form to which traditional feudal tyranny and despotism have led. But difficulties arise in trying to explain why this tyranny persists and in determining what steps should be taken to abolish it.

Wei Jingsheng faces a dilemma which confronts many of the other thinkers of the democracy movement, as well as many Western scholars. On the one, hand he expresses his commitment to the notion that the people are the masters of history--that history is not determined by a single powerful individual or group of leaders. This view is consistent with the criticism of the "cult of the individual" which saw one leader holding the fate of the country in his hands. Wei rejects the notion that the despotism existing in China can be blamed on Mao Zedong, the "Gang of Four," or even the leadership as a whole; it can only be the product of a deeply imbedded feudal culture. This fact gives rise to the difficult question of whether the Chinese people, because of these cultural characteristics, are prone to live under an autocratic political system. The defensive attitude that many democracy activists reveal in their assertion that the Tian'anmen incident is "proof" that the Chinese people had awoken and would no longer submit passively to tyranny is a sign of their sensitivity on this point. It

is somewhat surprising that Huang San, in the introduction, also views the Tian'anmen Incident as signalling a major transformation on the part of the Chinese people--who had finally awoken from their Cultural Revolution stupor (p. 71).

Wei's position that tyranny is not the work of a few individuals (which is shared by avowed Marxist-Leninists like Wang Xizhe) has certain implications for strategy. Just as leaders cannot be blamed for the condition of society, they cannot be depended on for improving it. For this reason, Wei emphatically states that he is not addressing the leadership, but rather his fellow "explorers" (p. 172). Reform carried out by the leadership cannot solve China's problems. This posture sets Wei apart from the majority of Democrats (including Wang Xizhe), who look to certain reformist factions within the leadership (usually Deng's pragmatists) to improve the condition of society. In this sense, Wei can be characterized as one of the most "radical" thinkers of the movement.

His radicalism is in the liberal direction. That is, he advocates individual freedom and rights. But his radicalism notwithstanding, there are certain conceptual boundaries which not even he crosses. Indeed, his ideas about alternative political orders reveal a great deal about political thinking in China in general. Wei has high praise for Western parliamentary democracies because of their "harmony" with individuality. Yet what he is unable or unwilling to recognize is the notion of pluralism--i.e., the existence of conflicting interests among the people and not just between them and the rulers. Wei's conception of society posits "us" vs. "them," the people vs. the elites. This observation need not be taken as criticism, especially since Wei displays a good knowledge of Western democratic theory. But it is an interesting reflection of the way in which social political conditions influence thinking. It could be speculated that the general avoidance of advocacy of conflict or struggle which one observes in the writing of the democracy movement might be seen as a reaction against the Cultural Revolution, which many of the activists experienced first-hand. Then, conflict and struggle were the guiding principles and the cause of much pain and bitterness. Wei's stress on the "harmony" with individuality that he believes characterizes democratic societies can be seen as a reaction against the Maoist idea of contradiction and struggle, which gave impetus to the Cultural Revolution.

* * *

The book's introduction by Huang San provides useful historical details concerning the democracy movement, but is sparse in its analysis

of the content of the writing. The tendency to avoid dealing substantively and critically with the writings of the democracy activists is unfortunate. While it is true that few writers in the movement attempt to present their ideas in a comprehensive theoretical framework, those who do (including Wei, notwithstanding his repeated opposition to theory in general) deserve a critical assessment, and not a protectionist attitude. Considering the conspicuousness of Wei in the movement, as reflected in the documents in *Un Bol*, Huang introduction could have paid greater attention to Wei's ideas. The documents may indeed "speak for themselves," but readers would profit from a critical assessment.

Constructive criticism from Western scholars is all the more important now that China's democracy movement is being revived in the United States and Canada through the journal *China Spring*. (See review in *SPEAHRhead* 16.) In their concern for not dealing too harshly with the "young democrats" or for not appearing to impose "Western values" on Chinese thought, Western commentators should not avoid asking hard questions. It is not enough for outside observers to record the writings of the movement, although this is an invaluable service. With large numbers of Chinese studying in the West, and with the main journal carrying the movement forward produced in the United States (and perhaps smuggled into China), it is all the more important that a real dialogue between Westerners and the Chinese dissidents be established.

Other documents in the book--those on to the "petitioners" movement, the case of Fu Yuehua, Ren Wandong and the Human Rights League--nicely complement the Wei selections. Both *Exploration* and the League dealt extensively with the petitioners' movement and the Fu case. Fu Yuehua was a young woman who became involved in long legal proceedings after having accused her unit manager of raping her. Fu lost her job, and then joined a group of peasants and workers petitioning for an improvement in their condition. She was one of the main founders of a Petitioners Council which was organized to represent them.

The case of Fu Yue hua evoked considerable sympathy within the democracy movement, and raised some important issues which were dealt with in many of the journals and wall posters, a selection of which are included in *Un Bol*. Several of the documents in this section deal with the questions of the constitutionality of her arrest and detention. This bears on the general question of the respect of the constitution, and in particular on the constitutionality of dealings with political prisoners--an issue on which Wei is quite outspoken.

Fu Yuehua's plight also raised political and philosophical questions concerning the state's

responsibility to its citizens, an issue which is addressed in a Human Rights League article. It is observed in this article that if the state had found a job for Fu, she would not have become involved in what the state considered "subversive" activities. Similarly, if the basic needs of the thousands of peasants who descended on Peking had been met, these people would never have had to come to complain to the government. Wei Jingsheng, who is particularly explicit and detailed in his exposition of the breakdown and degeneracy of Chinese society--he writes of starvation, prostitution, selling of children, crime, etc.--makes ample use of the petitioners movement to reject the government's claim that socialism, unlike to capitalism, provides for the basic economic and social needs of the people.

In his introduction, Huang is generally accurate in his historical account of the movement. Yet there are points on which he may be misleading. In the first place, he erroneously gives the impression that the democracy movement was a mass movement. He quite rightly points out that, unlike dissident movements in the Soviet Union, the China's democracy movement was not propelled merely by a few famous intellectuals. Still, he overstates his case when he claims that the movement rested on a "solid popular base" (p. 72). The wall posters at Xidan and on the other "democracy walls" around the country were read by countless thousands of people, yet such passive participation does not constitute a "solid popular base." The number of individuals who actively participated in writing posters, and more importantly, who engaged in printing underground journals, was extremely limited.

Huang's claim concerning the mass character of the movement rests to some extent on his assertion that the participants came from "the lowest classes in society." While it is true that many of them were working in factories, this misses the crucial point that they were often the sons and daughters of leading segments in society. The most dynamic element within the movement consisted of the generation of youth who were active as Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, and consider themselves to have "lost out." If one considers their class origin significant, then a distinction between these youth and "real workers" must be kept in mind. Perhaps the most significant implication is that many people of such background will be future leaders in their society--and most of them are disillusioned about their political system if not outright anti-Marxist.

These minor quibbles aside, *Un Bol* de nids provides a rich collection of first-hand material about the Chinese domestic scene. x

Recent Publications

Addresses of less-well-known publishers appear at the end of each entry.

JPRS items (see inside back cover) can be ordered from National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Department of Commerce, Springfield VA 22161 USA. Specify the indicated five-digit number (precedes the "J").

FBIS is also published by NTIS. Order by FBIS date (precedes the ">"). For PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan items, specify "China" series. For other countries, specify "Asia-Pacific."

Please do not request any items from SPEAHR.

Anonymous. "Commenting on a Viewpoint of the Main Contradictions in Socialism." Heilongjiang RB <20mJ17'81>. ("Commentator" article.) Holds that although bureaucratism is a stubborn disease, it not an incurable one; the problem is overcentralization, not socialism or China's social structure. "Those who advertise that the contradiction between the people and the 'bureaucratic class' is the main contradiction raise a slogan equivalent to the so-called slogan of 'human rights,' that is, 'strive for democracy and freedom, oppose bureaucratism and special privilege.' ...Those who have blind faith in and worship bourgeois democracy hold that we must practice (at least imitate) a Western-style bourgeois democratic system. It seems to them that there is no such bureaucratism in capitalist system. This is a manifestation of naiveté and ignorance.... [What they really want is] to break away from Party leadership."

* * *

Andors, Phyllis. The Unfinished Liberation of Chinese Women, 1979-1980. Forthcoming from Indiana University Press. From publisher's promotional announcement: "The status of women in China has changed dramatically in this century, but to what degree has the Chinese approach to economic development and social change affected the prospects for female equality? Andors...argues that the role of women in a society generally is a function not of female sexuality but rather of development strategy. Andors critiques both Marxist and capitalist modernization theories...."

Chen Changyin. "A Brief Discussion of Socialist Democracy." Shehui kexue (Social sciences) 10 {15o82756}. A discussion of the results of the Twelfth Party Congress on this subject. Although there are still contradictions in socialist society, non-class contradictions are more important than class ones. "Thus, we avoid the disaster of confusing the two kinds of contradictions. As for the small number of degenerate Party members, cadres, workers and peasants and

the serious criminals pursuing destructive activities in politics, economics and culture, we should crack down on them and enforce dictatorship over them, because, having transformed into alien-class elements, they are no longer problems within the people." [Note: Intellectuals are not among the social groups listed, and "counter-revolution" is not among the crimes. --Ed.]

"In the West, the bourgeoisie developed the democratic system to an unprecedented level and was the most progressive in history. However, bourgeoisie democracy is very false. We should reject its falsity and assimilate its progressiveness.... As democratic politics needs a strong guarantee, socialist democracy must be made into a legal system. The bourgeoisie one-sidedly emphasizes the legal system and negates rule by the people, stressing money, not ethics. For the sake of money, as long as there is a 'legitimate' excuse, any evil is permitted.... Today, summarizing the experience of more than three decades, we have realized that, without a good legal system, able men will also make big mistakes, and we have begun to give serious attention to the building of a complete legal system."

Chen Ruoxi. Democracy Wall and the Unofficial Journals. Publications Office, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California/Berkeley. According to the publisher's promotional announcement, "While this study is concerned primarily with the unofficial journals, the author provides a brief background on the Wall to give the readers a sense of sequence about its origins and its influence upon the appearance of the journals. She also includes a brief history of the free speech and publication movement as a whole, but her principal task is to analyze the contents and relationships of the journals and to assess their impact upon Chinese politics." (Berkeley, CA 94720; \$4.50).

Chen Weidian and Zhou Xinming. "Socialist Law Does Not Give Freedom of Speech to Counterrevolutionaries." Beijing RB <25m12J'81>. "Some people are of the opinion that there should be complete freedom of speech, and even advocate that even counterrevolutionary speech may be uttered, that the law need not and should not concern itself with this. The reasons given are: first, the uttering of counterrevolutionary speech is a problem of an ideological nature, and the laws are to punish conduct, not thought; second, taking legal action against the extremely small minority of people who utter counterrevolutionary speech will prevent the safeguarding of the majority's freedom of speech; third, making counterrevolutionary speech the object of punishment also makes it easy for thought and speech that is out of the mainstream to be likewise treated as counterrevolutionary and to be punished accordingly.

"This is wrong, because mere thinking is not the same as speaking. "Speech happens; it enters the realm of reality. Some speech may itself constitute a part of conduct, and so there arises the question of legality and illegality.... Class enemies really know the effectiveness of language,

including speech, writing, etc. They resent the fact that the media are in the hands of the Party and the state, and so they constantly adopt the spreading of counterrevolutionary speech, the concocting of counterrevolutionary rumors, the printing and distribution of reactionary publications, and other such means as their primary means of struggle with us.... In some localities...a small group of troublemakers are, under the banner of 'freedom of speech,' blatantly seeking publicity, confusing and poisoning people's minds, propagating some kind of 'independence of public opinion,' advocating some kind of 'absolute freedom of speech.'"

Cheng Hong. "Why is the Policy of 'Unifying with, Education and Reforming' Intellectuals No Longer Implemented." Hongqi 23 {1D82699}. There is still much anti-intellectual sentiment in China. Criticized in this article are such attitudes as: "An intellectual's tasks are light and comfortable; they cannot be compared with that of laborers and peasants who work so hard and sweat so much." "Workers and intellectuals are the creators of a society's wealth, while intellectuals are supported by them; they cannot be on an equal footing." [Such attitudes were the underpinning of the Party's former policies toward professionals and white-collar workers.]

The official change is explained: "The kind of policy the Party adopts toward intellectuals is determined by the Party's tasks and the state of the intellectual contingent during different historical periods.... Over the past few years, as the CCP Central Committee has worked persistently at bringing order out of chaos, it has readjusted the policy toward intellectuals, bringing it back into the right path.... The breaking of the bonds of 'leftist' thinking and the small producer mentality, the elimination of the erroneous influence of discrimination against intellectuals, and the abandonment of the outdated policy of 'unity, education, reform' should be seen as the key to this." Still, intellectuals must (as the 12th CP Congress stated) "improve their ideological and political education in accordance with their special characteristics."

Ching Feng: Quarterly Notes on Christianity and Chinese Religion and Culture, 25:4 (D). Baker, "The Question of Truth in a Chinese Setting." Glüer, "'People' in Chinese Tradition." Ting, "Another Look at Three-Self." Other articles and documents on religion in China.

He Jingzhi. "Views on Literary and Art Work at Present." GMRB <21m3J81>. The Vice Minister of Culture complains about works with "not-so-good ideological inclinations," and demands that writers and artists "overcome their unsavory practices."

Holm, David. "The Difficulty of 'Walking on Two Legs.'" Index on Censorship, 12:1 (F). An excellent account of the censorship of music in China, especially the recent suppression of foreign (including Hong Kong) popular music. Also discussed is the historical background of the

political role of music in Chinese history. [21 Russell St. London WC2B 5HP]

Hu Yaobang. Speech on literary and art criticism, the Bai Hua incident, etc. Excerpted in Zhengming Ribao <30J81>. Hu states that his criticism of one writer (Jiangsu's Gu Ertan) had been excessive. In general, "We must write a [critical] article in the name of an individual and not the name of a Party organization or editorial department; we must separate criticism of a work from criticism of its author."

Huang Huoqing. Report to the NPC on the work of the Supreme People's Procuratorate. People's Daily <6D23>. In defining the Procuratorate's duties, the chief procurator first lists "the repression of counterrevolutionaries" (followed by fighting crime).

Ji Xiwang. "Wang Bingzhang and 'China Spring.'" Zhengming 63 (1a). Discusses Wang's views on democracy and the rule of law. The reactions of the Chinese Communists and Nationalists to the China Spring movement.

Jiao Huima. "The Key Lies in Overcoming the 'Left' Designation." Zhejiang Ribao {10a82127}. One of a series of articles (all appearing in the same JPRS) on the question of how to handle intellectuals. "Some [erroneous] comrades do not think there is not much more to be done. They murmur that 'the intellectuals are difficult to deal with, because their desires are a bottomless pit which can never be fully satisfied. From these comrades' point of view, the status of intellectuals is already high enough."

Link, Perry, ed. Stubborn Weeds: Chinese Literature after the Cultural Revolution. Forthcoming from Indiana University Press. According to publisher's promotional announcement: "Perry Link, who lived in China during [1979-80] has assembled the most representative examples of 'stubborn weeds'--the writing that would not die in spite of the pressures of the Cultural Revolution. This volume includes fiction, drama and poetry, as well as comedian's dialogues and clappertales. The writers range from the prize-winning Jiang Zilong, to the controversial Bai Hua, to university students who wrote under pseudonyms in unofficial publications."

Lu Zhichao. "The Basic Policy of Attaining a High Level of Socialist Democracy." Hongqi 21. {1N 82466}. "It is one-sided and wrong to separate democracy from dictatorship, thinking that calling for a 'higher level of democracy' means ignoring dictatorship over the enemy, or that stressing the necessity of exercising dictatorship over the enemy means restricting democracy.... Socialist democracy...is incomparably superior to bourgeois democracy.... Bourgeois democracy is in essence bourgeois dictatorship, but the bourgeoisie has never admitted this.... The people, as masters of the country and society, must enjoy rights of management to varying extents and in various

forms in the political, economic, cultural and social life in which they participate....

"We must closely link the building of socialist democracy with the building of the socialist legal system.... Many people lack the concept of a legal system or are ignorant of the law. Our youth in particular are even more ignorant about the law and its meaning. Many of our Party members, including some of our leading cadres, fail to see the significance of developing the legal system. Some of them even have a 'special privilege' mentality and think that the law is aimed at common people, not at them. That is why there still exists the bad practice of failing to act according to the law or to strictly enforce it."

Nie Rongzhen. "Strive to Create a New Situation in China's Science and Technology Work." Hongqi 13 <19D23>. Emphasizes the contribution that scientists and other intellectuals can make to the economy. For example, even though the recent incentive system has improved the picture in agriculture, "there is a limit to giving full play to the initiative of the peasants, and some day the 'saturation point' will be reached." Thus, further gains must come from improved technology, i.e. from the work of intellectuals. "There are some people who say that 'our evaluation of intellectuals is exaggerated,' and that intellectuals are 'cocky once again.' These words are groundless. At present, our implementation of the policies related to the intellectuals has just begun and the resistance we are encountering both within and outside our Party is not small and can be regarded as being quite stubborn. I had a talk with a Guangming ribao reporter in August. Most people approved of this talk when it was published in the newspaper. There were also people who opposed this talk, criticizing the comrades in Guangming for this bourgeois stand. I have indeed offended some people on this issue. However, what is to be done? We must continue to fight for the interests of the Party and state, for the four modernizations and for the overall implementation of our intellectuals policy."

"On the question of implementing the policy toward intellectuals, it is still necessary for the media to make a loud public appeal. It is no good to talk about this in general terms; open criticism must be made. It is also no good to make mild criticism; it is necessary to make sharp criticism. Sometimes it is even necessary to conduct some struggles. Neither Marx nor Engels said that all intellectuals are reactionary."

P'eng Ming-min. "Taiwan and U.S.-China Relations: Eleven Years After the Shanghai Communiqué." Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 28 Feb 83. "More importance should be attached to political development in Taiwan, as, in the final analysis, it is the populace there who must bear the consequences of the outcome of the Taiwan issue. At stake for them are their economic prospects, political aspirations, human rights and democracy, cultural heritage, purposes and ideals."

Shaw, David. "Taiwanese Political Prisoners."

Detailed information on 24 cases. 13 pp.

Photocopies available from the author, P. O. Box 1153, Denver CO 80201. \$2.

Shen Wenfeng. "Active Recruitment of Party Members Among Intellectuals is an Important Policy for Party Building in the New Period." Shehui kexue (Social sciences) 11 {15N82756}.

Situ Mei. "'Son of Revolution:' from Hunan to New York" (in Chinese). Zhengming 63 (1J). A review of the book by Liang Heng and Judy Shapiro.

"Strengthen Public Security in Cities and Countryside, Consolidate Stability and Unity, and Guarantee Smooth Progress of Economic Adjustment." Issues & Studies 18:1 (I). Text of a document published by the Chinese Nationalists and attributed to the Propaganda Dept. of the Yunnan CP Committee. "It has been discovered that in some places an extremely small number of counterrevolutionary elements have either established contacts with espionage agencies abroad to pass on intelligence materials, or secretly established ties with one another and organized counterrevolutionary groups, just waiting for a chance to start uprisings; or fabricated and spread political rumors and put up counterrevolutionary posters, opposing the people's democratic dictatorship. In certain localities it has been discovered that the anti-Party and anti-socialist elements have organized underground organizations, secretly establishing ties with underground organizations outside the province to exchange information, to pass on underground publications, and to spread anti-Party and anti-socialist views. Some of them have even colluded with reactionary organizations abroad, in a wanton attempt to spread the ideas of establishing in China a so-called 'two-party system' and a so-called 'bourgeois republic.' They have attempted to infiltrate into key departments and the upper levels to wage 'lawful struggles.'" [64 Wenshou Rd. Mucha, Taiwan]

Taiwan Communiqué 10 (81). Short biography of imprisoned tang-wai leader Lin Yi-hsiung. Report on Edward Kennedy's press conference on the anniversary of the Kaohsiung incident, with text of statement by the senator. Report on legislator Hsu Jung-shu's interpellation: discussion of various "models" for resolving the Taiwan question (multi-system model, Singapore model, German model, and self determination), with Premier Sun Yun-suan's response. Interview with Hsu Jung-shu and Chou Ch'ing-yü about their imprisoned husbands Chang Chün-hung and Yao Chia-wen. Summary of editorial in Eighties Magazine defending Hsu. On Yu Ch'ing's proposal for a new political party. KMT spying in the US. Su Ho-ying on the abuse and torture of her husband Yang Chin-hai. Banned publications in Taiwan. Extracts from Taiwan Church News and other publications. (Postbus 31, 3984 ZG ODIJK, Netherlands, \$18/yr.)

Wang Dexiang. "The New Phase of Our County's People's Congress System." Heilongjiang RB {4a

82226}. A discussion of both the NPC and local congresses in the context of the new constitution. "Many years experience tells us that without solving ordinary work problems there is no way to bring to fruition the many important powers vested in the NPC... A concrete system under the guidance of democratic principles is the true bridge that will lead us to real democracy. Without such systems we would remain eternally on 'the far shore' from democracy, and therefore could not truly realize democracy." Wang also discusses representative's "right of unfettered expression."

Wu Zhiqiang. Kuangren liaoji (Crazy man's cure). May 1982 (mimeographed). This 31-page pamphlet from China appears to have been written by a mentally-ill man. It also contains many political references. It is possible that it is a sardonically-disguised political document, but we are not convinced that such a characterization would be accurate.

Wu states that he was labelled a rightist and was cleared after the fall of the "gang of four." He suffered from a split personality, and gives a long list of symptoms (delusions of persecution, grandeur and sexual attractiveness). There is a simple honesty in these descriptions and a coherence to the underlying delusional state that makes this an empathetic clinical portrayal. Political themes often become integrated with mental disorders. The account reads like a casebook on political disorders during the late Mao period; it is by no means an account based on strictly private events. In the end, Wu claims to have cured himself of his mental disorders. The essay ends with a letter to readers in all countries, commending to them his discoveries about the nature of schizophrenia and how to cure it.

Yamane Hiroko. "Asia and Human Rights." In: International Dimensions of Human Rights. [Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road W, Westport CT 06681. \$55.]

Yao Limin. "China Spring's' Overseas Welcome" (in Chinese). Qishi niandai 156 (J82). A discussion of the magazine, the movement behind it, and their relationship to Chinese politics and the four modernizations.

Yi Ming. "The Key Lies in Getting Rid of Anti-Intellectual Prejudice." Nanfang Ribao <GD2a11>. "Some of our leading cadres, because their 'left' viewpoint towards the intellectuals has not been eliminated, always emphasize the intellectuals' shortcomings." It is wrong to still be "making targets of intellectuals, bringing pressure and assuming great airs and being a cut above the intellectuals, lecturing and mocking them, speaking sarcastically, and regarding the merits of those who dare to put forward their ideas on a subject as shortcomings and as a sign that they are getting cocky."

Yu Haocheng. "The New Constitution Has Developed Socialist Democracy." PD <20D28>. Commentary on

the new charter. The latter is said to mark a new stage in terms of democracy and legality. There are additional clauses on the subject, which appear earlier in the text of the constitution.

Yuan Fang. "'Bitter Love' and Intellectual's Patriotism." Hongqi 13 <1m25J81>. The Zhao-Qian-Sun-Li discussion.

Zhang Chenghuan. "The Issues and Lessons of 'Bitter Love.'" Jiefangjun Bao. <17m29'81>. Lengthy attack on Chinese screen writer Bai Hua.

Zhang De. "The Intellectuals are a Force on Which the Modernization Program Depends." Qunzhong 19; reprinted in Hongqi {16N82553}. "We must continue to implement the Party's policy on intellectuals. This includes correcting leftover problems of cases of injustice, carrying out communist ideological education among intellectuals, study by intellectuals of their tasks and duties, and gradual improvements in the working and living conditions of intellectuals, based on feasibility and necessity.... Power plus lack of knowledge equals the issuing of confused and incorrect orders." To avoid this, "the leadership bodies should be comprised of people 'in the know.'"

Zhang Honglin. An Appeal to the Party and the Nation (in Chinese). Shidai (a hand-written mimeograph underground publication from China). This begins with a two-page unsigned account of the interlinked stories of two protesters, Zhang Honglin (the author of body of the document) and Chen Honggang. Zhang, from Henan, has a long history of putting up wall posters and writing protest letters about the leaders' perceived deviations from Marxism. Chen appears to have gotten into trouble by putting up posters demanding the release of Zhang. Zhang was cleared by the police around 1981 and released, although he was (at the time of writing) allegedly still under surveillance and had not obtained employment. The second person was still detained, and his release is demanded.

The next seven pages are a detailed statement by Zhang in the form of a complaint and self-defense addressed to the Party and to the people of China. He tells about his patriotism and loyalty to Marxism and his consistent opposition to Lin Biao and the "gang of four." The posters and letters he has written since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution are described. All actions are said to have been ideologically correct and legally protected. This document has a frantic, desperate quality of a person whose case is "complicated." He seems aware that no matter how correct his long-held views are by today's standards, he can never shake the stigma of having opposed authority. He has the air of a permanent outsider who has consistently made the error of taking too literally the regime's invitations to speak out.

Both Zhang's and Chen's names appear at the end of the final two-page condensation of the above. In form, this looks like the text of a wall poster that might have been posted in Tian'anmen (as is implied in the last sentence). x

CROSSREFERENCE

This section is comprised of items of information arranged according to Universal Declaration of Human Rights article number (see page 2), and broken down thereafter by country or territory. If no article of the Declaration is specifically relevant, we designate the category "00." If more than one article applies, our allocation may be arbitrary.

Inclusion of an item does not necessarily imply a judgment that a violation of human rights has actually taken place. For example, we include information on the use of capital punishment even in the cases of common-law criminals (under 05), though the Declaration takes no clear position on whether or not such executions violate human rights.

As with other material appearing in SPEAHRhead, we present this information in the belief that it will be of interest to members, but we cannot always vouch for the validity of the allegations. Our sources (usually the media of the country concerned) are indicated at the end of each item.

For abbreviation key and guide
to symbols, see inside back cover.

00-C. CLASS STRUGGLE.

During China's Cultural Revolution, "class struggle" was the vehicle of much human rights deprivation and came under disrepute. Now the authorities have restored class struggle to legitimacy. Although it is no longer the "key link," the class struggle continues to exist. According to an explanation for foreign consumption, this is necessary because: "Although the exploiting classes have been eliminated as classes, their remnants and other hostile elements are still around and they will lose no chance to make trouble. The ideology of the exploiting classes will retain its influence for a long time and will have the potential to corrupt some of our people." {BR16a 81777}

For internal consumption, the issue is put in somewhat different terms. According to Hebei's newspaper: "Elements hostile to socialism still exist. It is still possible that they engage in various kinds of destructive activities in political, economic, ideological as well as in cultural fields. This is an important reason why it is still possible for class struggle to exist to a certain extent." Among such hostile elements are "active counterrevolutionaries like Wei Jingsheng who maintain illicit relations with foreign countries and betray the top secrets of the state." Another reason for the continuing class struggle is Taiwan's separate condition. {HebRB 23J'82}

In a Party commentary on the subject of class struggle, it is maintained: "Most of the contradictions in Chinese society do not have the nature of class struggle, and class struggle is no longer the principal contradiction." Nevertheless, there are "hostile elements which deliberately sabotage and attempt to overthrow the socialist system." There are five such elements, and the first is "new and old counterrevolutionaries and enemy agents." {BJ24o82291}

02-C. EQUALITY.

Females. Gongren Ribao carried an article entitled "'Giving more Importance to Boys than to Girls' Is Above Reproach." Whether or not the author was serious, he deals with real attitudes. "History is like a vast sea and irrational things will be eliminated by the great waves of history. However, the fact that the 'stubborn' idea of 'giving more importance to boys than to girls' at present is widespread shows that it is correct and has full vitality. It cannot be explained away by the phrase: 'Feudal remnants have not been eliminated.'"

<4a10, refuted 11a9>

Ethnic Minorities. The importance of minority areas in China's economic development has been given emphasis. A Sichuan RB commentary recently quoted Mao Zedong as follows: "China considers the people of minority nationalities who live in an area larger than that inhabited by the people of Han nationality, an area which abounds in material wealth. The minority economy is indispensable to our national economy." However, the commentary implies that there have been difficulties in carrying out the new moderate policies toward these peoples. "Under the impact of certain historical factors and the ten-year turmoil, the propaganda front serving areas of minority nationalities in our province has found itself unable to meet the need for the development of the four modernizations program and to satisfy the demands of minority nationalities.... In the course of developing the Four Modernizations program, any discriminatory attitude in the work dealing with the area of minority nationalities...is wrong." {17a82172}

Although the non-Han cadre situation has improved, "in number and quality nationality cadres are far from meeting the requirements of further implementation of the policy of regional

national autonomy and of the modernization drive in national autonomous areas." {BJ27082291}

It is evident that racial strains persist. In Henan, Party members are found partially to blame. "There are comrades who harbor the ideology of Han chauvinism. Han chauvinism is expressed in overlooking the characteristics of the minority nationalities. Some even mistreat the minority nationalities." But ethnic minorities are themselves faulted for their "local nationalism," and for obstructing the government's modernization policies. "They stand still and refuse to make progress and obstruct the development of their nationalities and the unity of the various nationalities." {30S82243}

05-C. EXECUTION.

A "counterrevolutionary" policeman who reportedly supported the "gang of four" has been executed for allegedly killing 7 persons in Hebei. <K13J15'81>

05-SK. CATTLE-PRODS.

After considerable outcry from U.S. public opinion, the Department of Commerce has reversed its decision to permit the sale of 500 electric shock batons to South Korea. (H R Perspectives)

09-C. ARRESTS.

People's Daily reported the arrest in Canton of a 31-year-old Hong Kong man named Zhong Jiefa as a KMT agent. His job is said to have been to smuggle letters into China and then mail them back out, apparently to be used for propaganda purposes by Taiwan authorities. <9J16'81>

Three people were arrested in Yunnan for spying on behalf of pro-KMT forces in Burma. This brought to 18 the number of "KMT spies" arrested during the previous 12 months. "Factionalist" Peng Shaoqing of Yunnan's Baoshan Prefecture was arrested in November. He was accused by the public security office of having made false accusations against the Party "in a vain attempt to reverse the verdict on factional criminal elements." Earlier, Peng had served three years labor reform, but had not repented and after his release had organized letter-writing campaigns to the central authorities. <24N3D, AFP16J17'81>

Four leftists have been convicted as "counter-revolutionaries" in Wuhan, and sentenced to 13-20 years' imprisonment. They had "plotted to usurp the Party leadership in Hubei Province...and subvert the government in a vain attempt to overthrow the regime of the people's democratic dictatorship." {25S82243}

Former leading figures in Heilongjiang (including three surnamed Niu, Han and Shao) have been imprisoned for up to seven years. However, such leftists have not given up hope of a comeback, saying: "Hold on for another two years, till those old fellows die," and "We were too soft on them." {HLRB 11082243}

Raymond Ratillon, a French citizen and son of a Chinese and Frenchman, was released from a labor camp after 49 years. (NYT13A)

09-SK. IMPRISONMENT.

The sentences of two accused arsonists was commuted from death to life in prison. The two, were Moon Bu-shik, a 23-year-old theology worker, and Kim Hyon Jang, 32, a lay Catholic worker. The commutation followed an international appeal on behalf of the men. The US government was said to have feared violent protests if the men were executed. The men had been implicated in an attack on the US cultural center in Pusan during which one person died. Moon admitted participation, but denied plans involving North Korea. (NYT16M)

Fifteen student activists in three Seoul universities were arrested on charges of anti-Government activities. Some of them had distributed leaflets calling for press freedom, a free labor movement, and the release of imprisoned students. (NYT27M)

12-C. REPUTATION.

False accusation, common during the Cultural Revolution, is still "a general trend" in Hebei, according to the province's newspaper. "Some die-hard factionalists are still framing cases as their trump card to sow discord... An anonymous letter with only an 8 fen stamp from a false accuser will often keep leading organs busy investigating for half a year.... This has affected unity within the Party, broadened factionalist differences, slackened the fighting will of cadres and hindered the daily work of the Party and government" (Heb RB 21a). Former deputy prosecutor Liu Wensheng was arrested for having charged his superior with corruption (Heb radio 21a). {81777}

Xinhua carried an article entitled "What sort of Person is Fu Yuehua?" in which the character of the democracy movement's leading woman is impugned. However, Zhengming reports (with approval) that People's Daily declined to carry the piece, which was "full of humiliating personal attacks." <1J3>

13-C. EMIGRATION.

According to a pro-Soviet source, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security has concluded that the defection to Taiwan of Zhou Lingfei (Lu Xun's grandson) had been "a scheme carefully planned by the CIA and Kuomintang. {Ba Yi 1N82301}

Tennis star Hu Na, who has been granted asylum in the United States, has been told that she could return to China without fear. According to a Foreign Ministry spokesman, "In recent years, Hu Na frequently went abroad to take part in international competition after she was trained as a tennis player. The Chinese Tennis Association has declared that so long as Hu Na makes up her mind and returns home, the association will send her to participate in an international tournament to be held in Switzerland in June this

year. Therefore the question of prosecuting her did not exist in the past nor will it arise after her return to China. (NYT26M)

Macao and the PRC have concluded an agreement on immigration to the Portuguese-administered territory. 350 Chinese will be permitted to move to Macao each month. <SCM15D16>

16-C. MARRIAGE.

A Hainan woman who remarried without divorcing her first husband served two months in prison, after which she returned to her second husband. When armed judicial personnel showed up to insist that she return to her first husband, they were resisted by bystanders "who did not know the truth and beat up the five judicial personnel." Five were subsequently arrested. <29j4a>

Gongren Ribao carried an article condemning sexual liberation as is practiced in such countries as the United States. Family values "are not at all feudal dross, but a brilliant crystallization of spiritual civilization. We, the younger generation, should treat love seriously and never take the decadent as magical or let the sewage of 'sexual liberation' taint true and sincere love." <4all>

Steps have been taken to place some limits on intermarriage between Chinese and foreign nationals.

According to a summary of a Guangdong forum on the subject: "The forum conscientiously analyzed the past few years' work in the registering of marriages involving foreign nationals, and noted: Of those overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao compatriots and foreign nationals of Chinese origin returning to our province to look for a partner in marriage, the great majority have abided by Chinese law, and their marriages have been genuine and sincere. However, a few people have violated Chinese law and the Chinese marriage system and resorted to all sorts of tricks in an attempt to practice bigamy through fraud and deception. Some people have cohabited without registering themselves with a marriage registry office, thus defying Chinese law. In order to seek bourgeois material ease and comfort, some young women in our province have openly extorted money and property in the name of getting married, thus failing to abide by our socialist marriage system, ethics and moral principles. A very few parents have gone so far as to encourage their own daughters to do things that violate the moral principles of a socialist marriage. The forum noted: These problems have done harm to our socialist legal system and spiritual civilization. We must resolutely put an end to these problems."

Guangdong radio urged resistance to the corrosive influence of decadent foreign bourgeois ideology. "Only by so doing can we build civilized and happy families." {11o82243}

18-C. RELIGION.

Islam. The Chinese Institute of Islamic Theology has reopened in Beijing to train "young re-

ligious professionals." The institute was founded in 1955, but was closed in 1966. {XH18a 81777}

The China Islamic Association has printed 160,000 volumes of the Koran, and published Chinese-Arabic bilingual selections of the Koran. (Id)

Daoism. Hongqi carried a commentary on Lao Zi. "The intention of this early philosopher was to abolish 'governmental action.'" The influence of his philosophy of inaction is "reflected in society to this day." But this notion "aimed at seeking a way out for the society of his time; it had its own reasons and historical conditions for its emergence." It would be nihilistic to judge the ancients by modern standards. "Lao Zi was a wise and great ancient thinker.... It is natural to inherit this fine cultural heritage with a critical attitude. But we cannot mechanically compare the past with the present. If we take Lao Zi's view of 'inaction' as a yardstick to measure or present era, we will no doubt go against history." {1N82466}

Buddhism. The vice governor of Qinghai has warned of the importance of "distinguishing between what are proper religious activities and what are counterrevolutionary and criminal activities in the garb of religion." He added: "Youths and children under 18 must not be forced to join religious activities, to become monks or nuns and to study Buddhist scriptures in monasteries.... No one is allowed to take advantage of religion to oppose the Party's leadership and the socialist system or to disrupt the unification of the country and the unity between the people of various nationalities" <3a9>

A "reeducated" peasant is quoted by Xian radio as saying that he now understands that there are no gods, and that "we cannot accomplish anything by just praying to Buddha or chanting scriptures." {Sn13o82243}

Catholicism. In recent years, China has opposed such Vatican actions as the appointment of Deng Yiming as archbishop of Guangdong <BJ15J18 '80, SH17J18'81, HN16J18'81, ZJ18J19'81>. Nonetheless, the Roman Catholic Church continues to call for a reopening the relationship with China's Catholic Church. Pope John Paul II is said to hope that talks can be held on the situation of China's Roman Catholics, the most repressed Catholics of any Communist country. In 1949 they numbered 3.2 million. (NYT26o)

"Superstition." Although in recent years China has liberalized policies toward religion, "superstition" continues to be campaigned against, and sometimes such campaigns are clearly directed against the practice of religion. In 1981, Mao's remark about how the people have suffered under the feudal yoke ("authority") of religion was cited in Sichuan. (The other three "authorities" were politics, the clan, and male chauvinism.) An article in Sichuan Daily did not appear to distinguish between religion and "superstition," and linked the latter to clan activities. "These activities still assume serious proportions in certain areas. They not only have a harmful effect on the public's physical and

mental health, but also jeopardize life and property. This also gives some undesirable social elements and counterrevolutionaries a chance to disrupt rural stability and unite and interfere with socialist modernization of the countryside. This should arouse the attention of all areas." <2022J'81>

Last year, the suburban Shanghai edition of the Jiefang Ribao published a front-page article by the head of the Shanghai Party Propaganda Department which likewise complained that some people in the area engaged in "superstitious activities in the name of religion," and that in "one or two" communes such activities were "rampant." There were even a few Party members involved. Such "counterrevolutionary" activities were harmful because they tended to "sabotage socialism, damage people's physical and mental health, and hamper the state's education system." "We hope that our comrades will not be softhearted." <25j6a>

20-C. NON-COMMUNIST PARTIES.

People's Daily acknowledges that China's minor "democratic" parties were the victims of "leftist mistakes" after the 1950s; they are now to be given more of a role to play. "The relationship between the Communist Party and democratic parties is one of equality and one between friendly parties. Various democratic parties have the right to political freedom vested in them by the constitution. They have their own organizational independence and have the right to decide on their own problems. We must educate the CP comrades." <8J11'81>

21-C. ELECTIONS.

On December 10, the National Peoples Congress adopted a revised electoral law (regarding delegates to the NPC and local congresses). Instead of one-person-one-vote, the system is strongly weighted against the rural population. "The number of deputies to the NPC to be elected [by province-level congresses] shall be...in accordance with the principle that the number of people represented by each rural deputy is eight times the number of people represented by each urban deputy" (§14). The people electing these delegates are themselves elected by a weighted process. At the sub-provincial level, "the number of people represented by each rural deputy is four times the number of people represented by each urban deputy;" middle-level congresses "may" be more representative (§10).

Any four voters may "recommend" a candidate for local representative to the election committee. It is apparently not required that such a nominee appear on the ballot (§26). The number of candidates must exceed the number of seats to be filled (§27), and a voter is not limited to candidates on the ballot (§34). Method of election is secret ballot (§33). "Persons who have been deprived of political rights...shall not have the right to vote or to be elected" (§3).

<XH15D17>

On the same day, the Organic law of the National People's Congress was adopted. "A delegation of 30 or more deputies may submit bills and proposals within the scope and functions and powers of the NPC, and the presidium is to decide whether to place them on the agenda of the meeting, or first submit them to the relevant special committees for consideration and submission of report and then, after consideration, decide to submit them to the full session for a vote" (§10). Sessions may be secret or open to the public (§20). Deputies are obliged to keep state secrets (§40). Electing units have the right to dismiss their deputy (§45).

<PD10D15>

A local election in Hubei won by leftists has been voided by higher authorities. The winners were accused of having "personal ambitions and factionalist ideas." They had engaged in such illegitimate campaign practices as "putting up big-character posters, passing out handbills, spreading rumors, and framing others."

{HebRB22S82291}

23-C. ECONOMIC EQUALITY.

Peasant incomes in China's poorest areas are said to be improving. Ten percent of China's counties, mostly located in the North West and south-central parts of the country, were studied. (Tibet and Xinjiang do not appear to be included.) Average collective-derived income has increased from ¥55.5 (1978) to ¥82.6 (1981).

<BJ9a10>

The problem of the role of workers congresses, which have been established in 36,000 enterprises, has given rise to considerable confusion. At a 1981 forum on the subject it was said (XH paraphrase): "Lacking a correct understanding of the significance and role the workers congress system, some people mistakenly set democracy against centralism and democratic management against centralized guidance. Failing to make a distinction between the normal democratic life of the workers congress and anarchism, some others have doubts about this system and hesitate to implement it. All this is wrong."

"In accordance with the current system of economic management, the forum proposed that workers congresses be given the following rights: to discuss major matters of workers and staff members; to supervise, elect and recall cadres; and the right to make suggestions if and when the workers congress disagrees with decisions or instructions of higher competent authorities." Only 25% of the workers congresses have "done well;" "15% have fared badly, actually becoming a mere formality."

One of the speakers was CP Secretariat member Wan Li (XH paraphrase): "The power to run factories must be given to the workers. Some of our leading comrades are afraid of workers congresses being held and the masses airing their views. Why should CP cadres be afraid of the masses?"

<BJ9J10'81>

Police broke up a demonstration by thousands in Shanghai who were protesting poor living con-

ditions and lack of jobs. Many were arrested.
<AFP17J81>

26-C. ILLITERACY.

China still has an illiteracy rate of 25%. This figure applies only to people between 12 and 45 years of age. (Presumably the percentage would be much higher if the age span were increased.) Literacy is defined as knowledge of 2000 characters (only 1500 in the case of peasants). {XH4o82226}

23-C. ART AND LITERATURE.

Hongqi carried an article by Qi Fang on the question of non-Party writers and artists. "Lenin's remark 'Writers without Party spirit: Get out!' referred to writers who had joined the Party...rather than non-Party writers and authors in general. After the October Revolution, while leading the struggle against the 'proletarian culture faction,' Lenin mercilessly taunted the sectarian and closed-door view that the task of building proletarian culture could only be accomplished by relying on the efforts of the proletariat itself together with scientists, artists and engineers who were of proletarian origins. Lenin said this was a wholesale fabrication. He explicitly pointed out: 'In the activities in various fields, if we fail to form an alliance with non-Party personnel, we cannot begin to talk about successful communist construction.'"

Qi went on to urge a "hundred flowers" revival. "To implement this policy, we should encourage works of various artistic styles and schools and various literary and art viewpoints to compare, contend, compete and argue with one another. This includes ideological struggle. The idea of regarding the 'double hundred' policy as a practice devoid of criticism and struggle runs counter to the policy. Of course, it is harmful to adopt crude and repressive measures to deal with an ideological problem. We should learn to overcome various erroneous ideas by the method of persuasion and education. {16N82553}

An article in Liaoning RB (22a) carried an article about "realism." Two circumstances are said to inhibit realistic art: administrative restrictions, and alternatively, when writers and artists are unable "to adhere to the spirit of realism and turn freedom into a kind of subjective puffery and undertake to create whatever his heart desires." Stories reflecting foreign influences are a particular problem. Ding Ling is quoted to the effect that an author maximizes his creative freedom when he becomes a spokesman for the people.

The same paper contains a long paragraph paraphrasing Hu Qiaomu, which concludes: "We advocate that the main current of literature must uphold socialism and the interests of the people; it must display strong political themes. However, we do not hold that aside from this type of literature, all other works are not literature and that the people do not need such. Art which belongs to different categories has an even broader scope." {22a82226}

Literature. The "self-expression" question has been debated on the pages of Shanghai's Wen Hui Bao. Liang Yongan: "Some critics heap praise on authors who do not reflect life in the new era and who fail to portray the courageous struggle of the people and their selfless labors. This actually encourages authors to drown in their own small worlds, continually make empty cries, offer perplexity and sigh wearily in their own subjective circles." Actually, unfettered self-expression "always blots out 'one's own' personality." {22J'82 81777}

Sun Naixiu: Even the individual personalities of China's major writers, such as Guo Moruo, Lu Xun, and Ba Jin, seeped into their works. Still, "some comrades contemptuously reject the literary tide of self-expression in Western literary history and negate modern literature in one fell swoop. This shows a lack of...vision. Expressing individuality and the self is a historical tide in the history of the development of Western literature. This literary development and the development of European society--and with it the continued liberation of man and the continued development of his individuality--are intimately connected.... Only at the end of the Middle Ages was man's self-consciousness, as if awakening from a long dream, able to discover 'man,' to discover self. This was a glorious dawning of the history of mankind; it was a great beginning to the cultural renaissance and historical progress; it was absolutely not, as some comrades sum it up, the product of a negative tide of romanticism....

"How should mankind achieve freedom and prosperity? This is the profound meaning contained in the bizarre and motley array of modern literature. The current of this literature is certainly not, as some comrades suggest, an ultra-individualist literary phenomenon. In short, the expression of self in Western literature, the literary current of expressing individuality and the progressive social and ideological tides that have opposed feudalism, dictatorship and capitalism have always been as two sides of a single coin, a flesh-and-blood relationship. This literary tide reflects the historical course of mankind's march toward freedom and liberation. To write off or disregard the literary value of social significance of this literary tide is inappropriate.... [It is true that some people,] bent on singing their own tunes to their own miniscule souls, produce some mediocre and inferior works. We certainly cannot reject self-expression because of this." {22J 81777}

According to an article by Wang Meng in Hongqi: Writers must reflect "freshness in life and communist values," but "of even greater importance is to avoid writing about problems merely for the sake of creating problems, or writing about pain for the sake of pain." Successful writers should not become conceited. {1N82466}

Many college students have been unhappy about the pressures on writers. Zhengming reported: "At Peking University, the students posted the issue of Jiefangjun Bao criticizing 'Bitter Love' and crossed it out in red ink, while at the same time, they put up a poster beside it

criticizing the army paper. The great majority of the people, both inside and outside the university, both inside and outside Beijing, are obviously on the side of Bai Hua and 'Bitter Love.' <1J3>

For more on the "Bitter Love" controversy, see bibliography under: Link, Hu Yaobang, Yuan Fang, and Zhang Chenghuan.

Music. Last March the Party Central Committee and State Council promulgated a resolution banning the importing, reproduction, sale or transmission of "reactionary yellow" audio and video recordings. The decree appeared aimed at Western popular recordings. (See "Holm" under "Recent Publications.")

Musician Wu Zuqiang wrote in Hongqi: "We must strive to correct certain mistaken attitudes in the Party, attitudes which have existed for a long period of time and over a wide spectrum and which lead to little attention being given to education in the sciences and arts and discrimination against intellectuals.... Some people still feel that it is possible to create a spiritual civilization without culture and even to so far as to publicly propagate and spread such mistaken thinking." He called for more state funds to support the arts. {1N82466}

Some opera troupes have come under official criticism, and placed under new restrictions. In Canton, "although the situation as a whole is good, chaos and commercialization in opera performances have gained ground. The problems are quite serious. Among various drama types, the problem of Cantonese operas are the most conspicuous. (1) ...Some of the operas propagate feudal and capitalist dross such as the ideas of blind devotion to lords and parents, the three obediences, love triangles, ghosts, monsters, etc. (2) The style of some operas is not healthy, and the performances given by some troupes are not serious. (3) The titles of some operas are vulgar and some opera troupes use queer and philistine names to attract audiences." The Provincial Cultural Bureau called on the concerned units work "to eliminate the false and retain the new, get rid of the dregs and truly work through the old to bring forth the new." On Oct 7 a circular was promulgated calling attention to the social effects of stagecraft and severely restricting troupes' right to use actors from outside their own troupe. {10o82243}

Actor Yu Shuzhen wrote in Hongqi that his troupe had "decided to perform pieces with healthy content" and not cater to the tastes of "a small minority." The latter "did not enjoy the performance and began to make trouble." In Shenzhen "some people suggested that we sing and perform some popular songs from Hong Kong and Macao. This we did not do." {1N82466}

Comedian Jiang Kun noted in Hongqi that comic dialogue is popular in China. "Thus we should try to improve the ideological and artistic value of the performances and not simply perform comic gags in order to cater to the needs of a small minority with poor taste, nor simply try to get cheap laughs." Because some people display "a certain 'vagueness and uncertainty about

communism,'...it is important to fully utilize the characteristics of comic dialogue to reflect the pulse of our times, to propagate communist ideology." Thus, sarcasm and "vulgar forms of presentation" should be avoided." {1N82466}

CRITICISM. Last year the press carried numerous articles on the subject of critiquing art and literature. GMRB <24m2J>: "It should be carried out in a regular and orderly way.... Literature and art criticism, especially the criticism of problems of certain works, should be carried out any time, any place. Criticism means washing the face; it is hygiene. We must oppose the method of campaign to carry out literature and art criticism. One should not have to feel as though he is facing a great enemy and break away from normal practices as soon as criticism starts. We must oppose the erroneous attitude of refusing criticism and accepting only praise, not censure, and hollering around the place when we are criticized, whether or not the criticism is justified. We must improve the standards and methods of criticism, and gradually form a universal, normal and lively atmosphere of literature and art commentary, so that people can become accustomed to such criticism and it will become the normal practice.

A Canton commentator looked forward to better cooperation, and less intimidation, between critics and artists/writers. "To the masses, literature and art should be like swallows that defy the storms and like skylarks whose songs blanket the spring, but also like woodpeckers that peck at the worms in our life." <NFRB24m2J81>

Also, see bibliography under: He Jingzhi

SCIENCE. Although the Party's policies toward such intellectuals as scientists has moderated, Guangdong radio notes that "there are now obstacles to giving further play to the role of middle-aged scientific workers." One of these is low pay (averaging ¥65). "Day by day, their physiques will undoubtedly deteriorate." <25j6a>

An article in Jiefang RB discussed political problems in science. Leftists fail to regard science as a productive force. "On the one hand, people act in a shortsighted way and discriminate against and even ruin basic research, holding that 'this kind of money thrown into the pond does not even produce bubbles' with the result that research undergoes large fluctuations and is unable to gradually attain steady development. On the other hand, and perhaps even more serious, people misinterpret the slogan 'serve production,' and devour the personnel and manpower for applied research and actually eliminate such research." <2J11'81>

27-HK. FILMS BANNED

According to the HK Shibao, three companies have produced a version of Bai Hua's film "Unrequited Love" (see 27-C), but the Hong Kong government has banned it in the colony. Other recent films which the authorities will not permit shown (for fear of offending the PRC authorities) are: "Great Heaven and Sovereign Earth," and "If I Am Earnest." {5o82226}

Democracy (Continued from page 3)

constitutional order, at least given the limited pressure that we seem willing to apply. Private organizations, of course, are not capable of applying as much pressure as is the government. But even such efforts are sometimes capable of doing more harm than good--especially in countries characterized by anti-Western sentiment.

To increase knowledge of how to support freedom effectively, Freedom House has previously held two conferences (reported in its 1979 and 1981 yearbooks). The first was on supporting liberalization in the USSR; the second on supporting freedom in Muslim Central Asia (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Soviet central Asia). The present conference on the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan will carry this process a step further. The conferees were asked to address the following questions:

1. What substratum of attitudes do these lands' proponents of democratic evolution confront; what is the probable evolution in these attitudes?
2. What has been and may be the influence of outside models on Chinese political culture during the modernization process? What are the present and possible future interrelationships of the PRC and Taiwan? What is the relevance to each to the successful democratization of Japan?
3. What are the steps by which the two undemocratic regimes could make sustained progress toward democracy?
4. To what extent is self-determination for minority peoples feasible, and what is the relation of such possibilities to the question of freedom for the whole society?
5. Around 1979 there were impressive outbursts of democratic sentiment in both the PRC and Taiwan. How important were these movements, and what is the likelihood of their recurrence or enhanced effectiveness?
6. What are the cultural barriers to democratization, and how might these be overcome?
7. What aspects of the political cultures are favorable to democratic development, and how might these be enhanced?

We should be able to learn from the experience of democratic movements in other countries of the non-Western world. All of these countries have in common the fact that liberal constitutional democracy is widely perceived as alien because it developed in Europe and North America. Democracy's spread from those centers, though slow, has still been remarkably steady if seen in historical perspective. Only in the late 1970s did it at last become accepted in all of non-communist Europe. Beyond Europe, the

acceptance of democratic concepts has been most general in Latin America; here the influence of democratic countries has been relatively intense. Although the continent has been notorious for its juntas, essential concepts such as the possibility of a loyal opposition and freedom of the press are popularly accepted, and have often been institutionalized. However, political institutions there (even more than elsewhere) are fragile. The example of Chile reminds us that the most stable-appearing democracy is vulnerable; while the case of Brazil suggests that it is possible for the most brutal dictatorship to evolve toward democracy.

Alone among regions, the Middle East has seen democracy retreat. The area has been bedeviled by the Palestine question and the resurgence of a fundamentalist version of Islam. As for Israel, even this transplanted European democracy has seen some movement away from liberal democratic precepts in recent years, at least in the administered territories.

At least as mixed is the picture in Asia. Two of the poorest states, India and Sri Lanka, have functioning democracies, probably because of intense and long association with Britain. Japan's democratic institutions may have a similar explanation. Although the country enjoyed some democratic development in the early part of the twentieth century, today's stable democracy was imposed by the United States following World War II. Still, the Japanese case suggests that a society with some of the same cultural traditions as China can successfully operate as a democracy. The case of Thailand demonstrates that at least limited democracy can evolve in an Asian country that has experienced only marginal institutional pressures from abroad.

* * *

There are four separate polities dominated by "Han" people (ethnic Chinese). Because of its lack of geographic proximity, we shall not be examining Singapore. Likewise, Hong Kong is too special a case to be useful for our purposes. Though its people give every sign of desiring democracy, they know that China does not permit it. The nature of all four polities is not such as to give rise to optimism about prospects for democracy under Chinese rule.

Certainly neither Taiwan nor the PRC has made much progress toward achieving democracy. Although (as we shall see) the two cultures and two systems have a good deal in common, they also have their differences (as both ruling groups insist). In theory, and to some extent in practice, Taiwan is less absolutist. This is primarily because economic activity is generally

freer of government control. As for politics, although no genuine opposition is tolerated in either place, Taiwan's most moderate opposition elements (personified by Legislator K'ang Ning-hsiang) have been treated with more consistent respect than have their counterparts in the PRC. The pressures to offer positive affirmation of the political order are not as severe on Taiwan. Although the island's Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang/KMT) rulers claim to reflect traditional political Chinese virtues, more apt analogues seem to be found among their chosen allies such as South Korea and South Africa. Other exemplars of this limited-pluralist system are Singapore and Indonesia.

When it comes to the prospects for liberalizing the PRC, many of the problems faced are similar to those in all other dictatorships, but others are peculiar to Leninist regimes. In a sense, we may include Taiwan in this category, because the Kuomintang was organized by Leninists in the 1920s as an elite, centralized organization, and it retains many of its original characteristics to this day. To the extent that the two Chinese regimes are sui generis, the special problems of democratization presumably relate to (1) Chinese political culture, (2) a peculiar historical situation, and/or (3) parallel national interest or fears regarding the future. These are not conclusions, but offered hypothetically for acceptance, modification or rejection.

In examining the question of outside support for democracy in these lands, we will be faced with some common assumptions that, if true, cast doubt on the practicality or legitimacy of the effort. Many view Chinese political culture as essentially unchanging, and by extension unchangeable. (Even the official PRC media complains about the persistence of "feudal" attitudes.) Others view any attempt to "export democracy" as a misguided attempt to impose an alien system on a people perfectly comfortable under the system and in the culture in which they have grown up. Actually, such caveats are raised in defense of most undemocratic orders, and are easily dismissed. Let us briefly discuss some of the reasons that we doubt these claims in the case of the two Chinese regimes.

Both political orders are products of the traditional political culture (and to some extent, traditional political system), on top of which have been imposed Soviet-style institutions. In the PRC, there are the standard array of communist forms: an omnipresent state; an elite-vanguard single party; parallel state and party structures radiating from the center down the villages; a small, aging, but rarely challenged politburo; a privileged "new class" based on party membership of techno-bureaucratic standing;

homogeneous information media; and state socialism (with pragmatic unsocialist concessions where necessary for incentive purposes).

Yet, there have been times when the Chinese communist political order has looked very different from other communist countries. Though disunity within a communist movement is not unusual, it is usually muted if not completely hidden from the public. In China, on the other hand, there have been times when a sector of the public was mobilized to support one faction against another. Sometimes this has led to mob action. Although the Cultural Revolution was costly to the nation, and at least appears to have been universally repudiated, many people came to accept the notion that they had a right--even a duty--to take direct action in the name of revolution when those in control of the government engaged in backsliding. This attitude may explain the 1976 demonstrations at Tian'anmen Square, and also the 1978-1979 movement centered around Xidan Democracy Wall. Of course, the Cultural Revolution had been personally instigated and legitimized by Mao Zedong, whereas the other movements were spontaneous and not legitimized by the leadership. Nonetheless, here are repeated examples of large numbers of people expressing unorthodox opinions, usually at the expense of the establishment. The myth of the sacrosanct "party line" had been exposed. Now, ordinary people took it upon themselves not only to have independent political thoughts (this in itself was not new), but to express them.

To be sure, several Eastern European countries have seen spontaneous uprisings, but here the governments owe their existence to the Soviet Union; there is an obvious question as to their legitimacy, and nothing novel about the idea that the local people's political activities were legitimate (much as this is denied by the ruling groups). But the PRC is no satellite; its leaders no running dogs of foreigners. Indeed, the nation's rulers owe their own legitimacy largely to the fact that they have stood up to the "imperialists" and "social imperialists" as no Chinese government had been able to do for centuries. Inasmuch as nationalism is not now a genuine issue, it is all the more difficult to dismiss dissension as irrelevant to the question of what type of political order is compatible with Chinese culture and Chinese realities.

Taiwan is more comparable to Eastern Europe, in that the Nationalist regime owes its existence to the United States. Its legitimacy is further questioned because of its carpet-bag nature, with the Taiwanese (at least 85 percent of the population) having little say in the affairs of state. Thus, dissent is treated much

as it is in parts of Eastern Europe; there is some toleration of criticism, but those who question the legitimacy of the regime are severely repressed. It would have been inconceivable for Chiang Kai-shek to call on the public to rise up against the establishment the way Mao did. No one questioned Mao's legitimacy; Chiang would not have been so fortunate. The legitimacy crisis is even more grave now. Because of official intransigence regarding the "Republic of China" myth, the handling of foreign policy has been so bungled that the regime is officially recognized by almost no other government--a fact that cannot be lost on many Taiwanese. But at issue is not so much the legitimacy of the Chiang family (of undoubted popularity) as their means of perpetuating their tenure in office.

It is important for our purposes to note that both Chinese leaderships give lip-service to the need for democracy. The Nationalists lip-service seems largely for foreign consumption. Internally, there is little embarrassment about the continuance of martial law and the suspension of the constitution. In the PRC, however, the domestic media have been filled with praise for democracy, despite the term's bourgeois connotations. An example from People's Daily at the time of the promulgation of the revised Constitution in December:

"The new constitution...was drawn up by the party on the basis of both positive and negative experience gained in the past 32 years by the people under its leadership, especially the bitter lessons of the 10 years of internal disorder [Cultural Revolution] during which socialist democracy and the legal system were seriously damaged. Without democracy, there will be no socialism....

"The fundamental rights and duties of citizens have been given greater importance and the guarantee of citizens' personal rights has been strengthened. In the new constitution, the fundamental rights and duties of citizens are arraigned in the second chapter. [It had been in the third.] ...This shows that our country now attaches greater importance to the fundamental rights and duties of its citizens and that our state organs of the people's democratic dictatorship have been established entirely for the people's interests. Thus, the concept of "all powers belong to the people" has been better displayed. In the chapter "Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens," the citizens' personal rights are more extensively guaranteed. In addition to the provisions of the previous constitutions on the inviolability of citizens' personal freedom and homes, there are additional provisions in the new constitution, for instance: that the personal dignity of citizens

is inviolable; insulting, slandering, falsely charging or framing citizens through any means is outlawed; citizens have the right to demand compensation, according to law, for losses due to violation of their rights by any state organ or functionary, and so forth."*

In the face of such impressive language (which is virtually required reading for Chinese), the arguments that freedom and democracy are illegitimate or hopelessly alien are certainly called into question. Still, we are left with the feeling that for now these words have little practical real meaning.

Democracy requires free elections. In the past, elections in China were totally controlled exercises. In recent years there have been some experiments with somewhat freer elections at the local level. In most cases, the voters appear to have been almost as non-plussed as the cadres who were supposed to carry them out. Having learned all their lives that elections were for the purpose of ratifying the decisions of higher authority, they found it awkward (even scary) to make real choices. But in some places (university communities, factories in the more cosmopolitan centers) the elections turned into quite exciting affairs. Sometimes charismatic figures emerged, now fighting for the rights of constituents, now defending the leftist *ancienne régime*, but more commonly defending the idea of liberal democracy.† In Taiwan, elections have been held more frequently. Although it is required that campaigns be short, they are lively affairs. True, sometimes candidates who overreach themselves are imprisoned. But sometimes non-party people are allowed to take office. Although in both Taiwan and the PRC such elective offices are powerless, they can (especially in Taiwan) provide a platform for further political activity.

All this might suggest that the primary barriers to democracy are political, not cultural or systemic, and that all that would be required for both lands to have governments elected is for the present rulers to allow it to happen. But even if this assumption (which many will certainly challenge) is correct, it does not necessarily follow that democracy, once established, could be sustained in the long run.

It is true that democratic institutions, like

*Yu Haocheng, "The New Constitution Has Developed Socialist Democracy," *Renmin Ribao*, 20 December 1982, p. 2, FBIS I:249).

† See, for example, the brilliant essay on the subject by a candidate at Peking University. Hu Ping, "On Freedom of Speech," translated in *SPEAHRhead*, nos. 12-15.

all political institutions, tend to benefit certain elements in society more than others. Thus, official spokespersons in China tend to insist on socialism first, and democracy a distant second (with the "dictatorship of the proletariat" properly intervening in any democratic process that goes the "wrong" way). We argue that there is more apt to be net exploitation of the working class in a closed system where the workers cannot organize to demand their share of the pie from the "new class." In China they have not been free to so organize, though in the late 1970s peasants did come to the capital to openly demand their rights and an improvement in their conditions. A worker's question at Xidan, "Why is it that factory workers can elect their unit leaders by secret ballot, but when the leaders of our country are chosen, we can have no say whatsoever?"* suggests that many workers understand democracy at the factory level, and some have an expectation (or at least hope) of expanding democracy on the basis of experience under communism.

Although those involved in making such demands were subsequently arrested, the hesitancy of the repression may indicate that the leadership was in some way unsure of itself. Perhaps it suggests a leadership painfully aware of the contradictions of ideology and reality. Or maybe the elite's regard for the Confucian concept of the responsibility of leaders to followers made the leadership think twice before they finally cracked down. Cynics, though, would say that Deng Xiaoping had only been unsure of himself vis à vis his opponents on the left; when the liberals had served his purposes in helping in the battle against them, they were dispensable.

Dissident rallies in the Soviet Union have always been poorly attended affairs, with at most a dozen protesters. Perhaps Soviet repression is invariably so quick and effective that hope has simply vanished. Yet, those experienced with the USSR believe that there is not much sympathy for dissidents. Witnesses of crowds at Xidan and other dissident events in China paint a different picture. They report, for example, that Canton's Li-Yi-Zhe group are well-known and honored. True, we cannot say that a majority of Chinese approve of dissension. Still, many Chinese perceive the difference between rabble-rousing and pointing out shortcomings of the system. After all, most Chinese must have experienced, and resented, the arbitrary exercise of authority, and many a soul must have wondered why he or she was so

powerless to set things right. For some, the Cultural Revolution was a revelation for it taught people that rebellion is justified; for others, the lesson learned was that challenging authority harms society.

Perhaps even more compelling is the legacy of Confucianism, with its emphasis on social harmony and prohibition of insubordination. This is one of several congruencies between Leninism and Confucianism. Although "correct" criticism is always meritorious, under neither philosophy is opposition legitimate. The rulers of Taiwan and Singapore seem to find the idea of a "loyal opposition" as difficult to understand as those in Beijing and Moscow. Politics is monolithic and all-encompassing, with economic and religious structures relegated to a secondary and dependent position. However, there have been countercurrents in Chinese history, and the more the Communist Party has identified its legitimacy with tradition and nationalism, the more it has opened itself to these currents.

One countercurrent is the right of "the people" (however defined) to revolt (implicit in the concept of the Mandate of Heaven). Another is the traditional contradiction between the absolute power of the central government on paper, and the lack of integration of the centralized apparatus with village China. There was also an undercurrent of philosophical anarchism, and the principle of governmental non-action (wu wei). The lineage (clan) was also an institution which countervailed the power of the state. Confucian arguments may be used to defend authoritarianism (as they are on Taiwan), but they can also be cited to deny the superiority of the state to family loyalty. The more modern legacy of Sun Yat-sen is equally ambiguous, and Taiwanese dissidents are fond of turning the good doctor's more democratic precepts against his self-styled disciples in the KMT.

Chinese attitudes toward law are colored in a most unfortunate way by tradition and semantics. The first Chinese rulers who acted in the name of "law" (fa) were extremely oppressive, and the legacy of these "Legalists" has been to prejudice the nation against the rule of law. The more sophisticated Chinese realize that "law" in the old Chinese sense has nothing to do with real law. (When the democrat Hu Ping complains that the traditional Chinese political system was "Confucianism in form and Legalism in substance,"* and that "Legalism" still poisons Chinese politics, he is obviously not arguing against the rule of law.) There have been some, such as the seventeenth century political philosopher Huang Zongxi, who argued for rule of

*John Fraser, *The Chinese: Portrait of a People*. New York: Summit Books, p. 237.

*SPEAHRhead 12/13, p. 51.

law rather than men.

But this was a distinctly minority view. Today, the PRC is placing great emphasis on the need to establish a system of law, but it is an uphill battle. On Taiwan, the population (with its experience under Japanese administration) is quite amenable to modern legal institutions. But the usual practice in both the PRC and Taiwan is to exempt political offenders from the protections of the legal system.*

Ideology in both the Confucian and communist traditions has placed high value on the generalist. (This is less true with the Chinese Nationalists, whose state is dominated by militarists and techno-bureaucrats). The traditional generalist was the "ru," or Confucian scholar/philosopher/poet. Communists see the ru as effete parasites, a perception which gave rise to intense anti-intellectualism after 1949. But for all Mao Zedong's efforts to "resolve the contradiction between mental and manual labor," and the recruitment of somewhat more rustic types during the Cultural Revolution, cadres today still have much in common with the mandarins. They must be steeped in philosophy (Marxism), and also know a little about various professions. But there is bound to be some tension between these two sides of cadres; the better educated they become, the less tied to Marxist simplicities and rigidities they are apt to be.

The Peasantry

The peasantry's role in any democratization is fundamental, but probably not decisive. Rural people do not normally determine the nature of governments. In a democracy, however, they can be a powerful force, as the example of Japan demonstrates. This suggests that China's peasantry will not determine whether the PRC "goes democratic," but if the country does, they will be the major beneficiary.† This, in turn,

reduces the likelihood of democratization, because under the circumstances democracy would probably result in a shift from the "haves" to the "have nots." It is the "haves" who have the power to determine the nature of the system.

Unlike other third world countries, peasants in the PRC are almost never allowed to change their residence from rural to urban. Thus, even though city people have been forced into the countryside, there is perhaps less interplay between city attitudes and rural attitudes in China than in other countries. Indeed, recent developments point to a great deal of hostility between city and country, with the enforced sojourns of city youth exacerbating as much as reducing this hostility. One suspects that the result is that we outside observers have an especially poor understanding of what peasants (80% of the population) really think of the system. It may also be uncommonly difficult to estimate the degree of their potential support for, or opposition to, possible democratic change. We find it disconcerting that many of China's "democrats" seem little concerned with bringing democracy to the countryside. Their idea of democracy is often Mencian: Power to "the people"--who are defined as the intellectuals. Perhaps this is unsurprising. After all, a truly democratic China would be controlled by those who till the land, and neither the communists nor the intellectuals see themselves as benefiting from this.

Certainly the present regime is no more inclined to listen to the peasantry than are the dissidents. On December 10, the National Peoples Congress adopted a revised electoral law (regarding delegates to the NPC and local congresses). Instead of one-person-one-vote, the system is strongly weighted against the rural population. "The number of deputies to the NPC to be elected [by province-level congresses] shall be...in accordance with the principle that the number of people represented by each rural

*Recently, under pressure from the United States following the murder of interrogation-victim Carnegie-Mellon Professor Ch'en Wen-ch'eng, the law in Taiwan was changed to provide for a lawyer to be present while a suspect is questioned--a development duly noted in the latest State Department's Human Rights Report (p. 692). What is not noted is that this provision applies only to civil cases, not to martial law cases. It is precisely under the latter that most of the abuses have occurred.

† That peasants suffer from the absence of political freedom was tacitly admitted by Gansu's provincial radio station. Previously,

we are told, local people realized that the agricultural policies carried out in the province were erroneous. One member of a county party committee had put forward "dissenting opinions," but the leaders slandered him. "They also stirred up a cold wind, and suppressed the people's revolution.... Their efforts put all cadres in a dilemma. When they emphasized production, they feared that [bad political] labels would be stuck on them. If they neglected production [in favor of politics], they feared that the people would starve.... [Nonetheless, those in power] did not allow people to reveal the truth." Quoted in SPEAHRhead 1, p. 21.

deputy is eight times the number of people represented by each urban deputy."*

Chinese peasants, we suspect, are like peasants elsewhere. If we are right in this, they value family or individual control over their production, income, and way of life. We know, however, that Chinese peasants are accustomed to outside agents telling them what to do; when one must, one bends with the wind. The degree that this interference is perceived as legitimate is unknowable. But the petitioning peasants led by Fu Yuehua in 1979 represented an old tradition. The tradition suggests that when people see a chance for redress, they will grab it--perhaps especially those, such as peasants, who have little to lose.

An argument can be made that Chinese peasants have good reason to support the communist system. They know that much-needed peace (as well as some equalization of status) followed the "Liberation." Recently, Deng Xiaoping has gone far to introduce autonomy and incentives in agriculture. Will this make the peasants more pro-government? Or will it cause them to want democracy? The answer probably hinges on the amount of education they can gain. Today, it is probable that roughly half of China's rural people are functionally illiterate. When this situation improves, peasants (who are mostly under 35) are increasingly apt to ask their leaders: "What have you done for me lately?" Still, such dissent is unlikely to threaten the system, particularly since there is no alternative power structure available to organize and focus dissent (as there was in Poland and Iran). Only a rural based revolution, such as the Taiping of the nineteenth century or the communists of the 1930s, could perform that function. This would entail a civil war that no one wants.

In Taiwan, the land reform carried out by the Chinese Nationalists in the 1950s was a key to KMT success. However, in more recent years the government has kept crop prices so artificially low that farm families have to send members to work in factories in order for the family to survive financially. Typically, farming has not been profitable, and is engaged in by many farmers for the purpose of holding on to the land. Given this situation, it is not surprising that some of the leading dissidents are rural in

domicile and orientation. This fact, combined with economic realities and the experience of Japan, suggest that farmers would be active participants in a democratizing process.

The Intellectuals

The party "reformers" see a close connection between intellectuals and the rural condition. As former science czar Nie Rongzhen put it in the party journal last year, even though the recent incentive system has improved the picture in agriculture, "there is a limit to giving full play to the initiative of the peasants, and someday the 'saturation point' will be reached." Thus, further gains must come from improved technology, i.e. from the work of intellectuals.

"There are some people who say that 'our [positive] evaluation of intellectuals is exaggerated,' and that intellectuals are 'cocky once again.' These words are groundless. At present, our implementation of the policies related to the intellectuals has just begun and the resistance we are encountering both within and outside our party is not small and can be regarded as being quite stubborn. I had a talk with a Guangming Daily reporter in August. Most people approved of this talk when it was published in the newspaper. There were also people who opposed this talk, criticizing the comrades in Guangming for this bourgeois stand. I have indeed offended some people on this issue. However, what is to be done? We must continue to fight for the interests of the party and state, for the four modernizations and for the overall implementation of our policies regarding intellectuals.

"On the question of implementing this policy, it is still necessary for the media to make a loud public appeal. It is no good to talk about this in general terms; open criticism must be made. It is also no good to make mild criticism; it is necessary to make sharp criticism. Sometimes it is even necessary to conduct some struggles. Neither Marx nor Engels said that all intellectuals are reactionary."*

These remarks indicate that the status of the intellectuals is a hot issue in China. Nie's main concern is maximizing the intellectuals' contribution to economic modernization. But it cannot be lost on people like him that the first to perceive government policies as mistaken, and the most articulate critics of such perceived mistakes, will be the intellectuals. One suspects that this is why his critics in the

*New China News Agency, text of Electoral Law, §14, FBIS I:243. The people electing these delegates are themselves elected by a weighted process. At the sub-provincial level, "the number of people represented by each rural deputy is four times the number of people represented by each urban deputy;" middle-level congresses "may" be more representative (§10).

*Nie Rongzhen, "Strive to Create a New Situation in China's Science and Technology Work," Hongqi #13, 19 December 1982, FBIS I:247.

party fear their "cockyness." In other words, how the "problem" of the intellectuals is dealt with is extremely important, and may determine what chance China has of becoming democratic.

* * *

With the above considerations in mind, we should be able to consider a range of alternative futures for the PRC and Taiwan. The alternatives should set forth scenarios of change or stability that we might imagine for the next generation. The problem for the conferees then becomes how to estimate the probability of each, the desirability of each, and the ways in which relevant outsiders might act to promote the most desirable and prevent the less desirable scenarios.

I - PRC SCENARIOS

- A. Repeat of mid-1970s to present.*
- B. Political modernization leading to:
 - B-1. Yugoslav model (production-unit democracy)
 - B-2. Thai/Japanese models (liberal democracy)
- C. Violent factionalism leading to military government and authoritarianism on the South Korean or Polish (post Solidarity) model.
- D. Violent factionalism leading to anarchy, widespread destruction, and finally:
 - D-1. Restored oppressive authority
 - D-2. A pluralistic, more decentralized order
- E. Authoritarian regime on KMT model, perhaps followed by (B) or (C).

II - TAIWAN SCENARIOS

- A. Repeat of mid-1970s to present.
- B. Iberian-style transformation to a democratic system (perhaps with KMT becoming a Japanese-style Liberal-Democratic Party).
- C. The military/techno-bureaucratic balance shifts in favor of the military to prevent shift to Taiwanese control.
- D. Violent overthrow of KMT; shift of power to Taiwanese:
 - D-1. A new dictatorship
 - D-2. A democratic system
- E. Retrocession to PRC (then following one or more of the scenarios under I):
 - E-1. By conquest
 - E-2. Gradual absorbtion

* In this scenario, the history of the post-Mao/post-Chiang (Kai-shek) years would be repeated. There would be fluctuations in freedom and human rights, but little real progress. Scenario A is probably everyone's choice in

Merely listing these scenarios (and many more might be suggested) points to the likelihood that the futures of the PRC and Taiwan are open-ended, and that there are dynamic elements of change that may render the standard scenario (A) less plausible.

The next generation of people in the PRC and Taiwan will not be like the last. The old verities and enthusiasms have been dulled and often destroyed by experience. Many people will be looking for new opportunities and new solutions, at the same time fearing the chaos that any change may bring in its train.

As we try to think out the details of the various scenarios, we must wonder what the influence of United States policies might be. What kinds of information should the U.S. be imparting to the two peoples, and in what ways? Does it help when foreigners struggle against violations of human rights, or is this merely a way to make us feel better? How often does it really (1) help individuals (2) advance the cause of democracy? Should we attempt to publicize the development of dissent and the ideas and heroism of individuals such as Wang Xizhe and Wei Jingsheng, Li Ch'ing-jung and Shih Ming-teh? Can this be done without appearing to be partisan? Should the fight be waged primarily by foreign governments, or by private organizations? Openly or quietly? What is the potential leverage of Western military or economic relations? Do alliances or good relations give us an opportunity to promote change, or do they merely strengthen the existing order, and thus oppression? Can the more democratic Asian states, such as Japan, India or Thailand, be encouraged to play a part in promoting concrete models that would help to liberalize life in the PRC and Taiwan?

Although dramatic change in Taiwan is quite conceivable, the PRC will not liberalize overnight. Until the Chinese people feel that there is a possibility for authentic change, most will live within the assumptions of their existing system. Our task is to respect their humanity by assuming their oppressions to be as keenly felt as those of other similarly-situated peoples, and their potential desires for freedom to be as great. The Chinese are not a separate breed of humanity, gathered into an undifferentiated mass with mass interests. They are people, and people with individual and changing concerns. x

terms of probability, at least for the PRC. (For a variety of reasons the probability of "A" is somewhat lower for Taiwan.)

Dissidents Speak

The following is an account of a conversation between a pseudonymous Hong Kong resident and democracy advocates in China. It was published in the Hong Kong magazine Zhengming in September {82172}.

Bracketed comments have been supplied by SPEAHR. "Document..." refers to a document in James Seymour, The Fifth Modernization (available from Earl Coleman Enterprises, Box T, Crugers NY 10521 USA).

I went to Beijing on a pleasure visit with a young friend of mine from Guangzhou. In Beijing this veteran Red Guard encountered many "old comrades in arms." One evening, we unexpectedly met several friends of [imprisoned] Wei Jingsheng [author of documents 12, 30, 51, 55] and Liu Qing, and talked with them about the new situation regarding Wei, Liu, and others....

GUEST: What is the latest news about Wei, Liu, and the others?

HOST: In China, people cannot contact such "enemies." Only their family members can see them and deliver necessary things to them. Wei Jingsheng's father long ago took him to be a counterrevolutionary and denounced him as such before his arrest. Wei's girl friend Peng Ni is good to him but has not seen him recently. Zhao X [better known by his pen name Lin Bing] has become responsible for Tansuo [former journal edited by Wei Jingsheng]; he is the author of the poem "For You..." which appeared on Xidan Democracy Wall. This person has literary talent, his thinking is liberated, and he is fairly radical. However, Zhao has been subjected to a great deal of pressure from the Public Security Bureau--both hard and soft--and he has now simply changed into different person: pessimistic, disappointed, and dejected. He frequently holds dances in his home and hangs around with shady characters. The change in him is too much. His girlfriend says she wants to "sever relations" with him, and some upright young friends of his have also become estranged from him.

GUEST: Liu Qing's "Prison Notes" [Sh 14/15] had a great impact in Hong Kong. Many newspapers and periodicals strove to be the first to publish it, and it also appeared as a book.

HOST: The price paid for transmitting "Prison Notes" was the arrest of Liu Qing's brother Nianchu and Tansuo's editor Lu Lin [see Sh 6/7 p. 38-40].

GUEST: How did the Public Security Bureau know?

HOST: It looks as though somebody installed bugging devices in their homes. In fact, we people have been put under close surveillance by the bureau. However, we do not engage in unworthy activities, such as as subversive conspiracies, so we are unafraid.

GUEST: In foreign countries, bugging is a crime. Nixon even lost the presidency because of the Watergate bugging.

HOST: But in China security personnel can exercise "dictatorship" over the common people, and all the freedoms promised in the constitution are a sham. Public security personnel can open your letters, and they can photograph your activities with telephoto cameras. For them, installing a bugging device is nothing.

GUEST: The youths striving for democracy have extraordinary courage.

HOST: The great majority of them are people who are ready to give their lives to the democracy movement in the spirit martyrdom. Many of the viewpoints expressed in the articles written by Wei Jingsheng, especially his article "Which is Wanted: Democracy or a New Dictatorship?" [in which Deng Xiaoping was attacked--Document 51] have been exchanged among us, and everybody holds identical or similar views. At the time they were published, some of us thought that such things should not be written and such tactics should not be pursued; the controversy over this was fierce. But Wei thought that the masses should be told the real situation and he did not shrink from sacrificing everything.... Liu Qing took himself right to the doorstep by going to the Public Security Bureau "to defy the law." The Public Security Bureau was put into an extremely awkward position by his refutations and was unable to answer them. But they still exercised "dictatorship" over him. Many articles written by Wang Xizhe [member of a the Li-Yi-Zhe group] analyzed the question of China and the communist movement from a Marxist viewpoint. What crime was that? Why do the public security personnel arrest such youths?

GUEST: I have read almost all articles by these young people. Their viewpoints are not all alike, but how commendable is their spirit of seeking truth! Putting these thinking people into prison means a great loss to the nation....

HOST: Not only do we all admire the spirit and articles of these people; even in prison many inmates treat them as heroic figures. If

Liu Qing had not been helped and "covered for" by other convicts he would not have been able to write his memoirs in prison, where he was under close surveillance, and he would have had no way to get the manuscript out.

Of course, the youths in the democracy movement are made up of good and not-so-good people jumbled together, even including some of the dregs of society. Yang Guang [see Sh 14/15, p. 34, n. 20] and Yu Yi [ibid., p. 63, n. 28] are such people. After Wei was arrested, Yang still wrote articles that foolishly called on people to take up arms, but at Wei's trial he cooperated with the prosecution and put all the blame on Wei. Yang was quitted. Yu Yi is the author of the poem "The Imperial Palace is Far From the Chairman's Hall." After being released from prison, he obtained special consideration, so it is obvious that he cooperated with Public Security.

GUEST: Wang Xizhe is of the view that eventually the Party's reform faction, faced with attacks by the "whatever faction" [Maoists] and the opportunist-bureaucrats, will go forward hand-in-hand with the young democrats, intellectuals, and broad masses. Is this possible?

HOST: ...The democratic forces and the masses cannot place too much hope on the reform faction. While striving for cooperation with them, the democratic forces and the public need to be on the alert for a "change" in them. The democratic forces and the public at large must not just be their tools; they must maintain independence....

GUEST: Some people think that in the early 1950s the Party was good and was supported by the people, and that if the traditions and way of doing things of that time were restored, China would change for the better....

HOST: Most of us do not hold this view.

Actually, the ten-year calamity of the Cultural Revolution was a consequence of the 17 years preceding the Cultural Revolution and cannot be separated from those years. If the spirit at the beginning of the '50s was so splendid, why was there...the 1957 "anti-rightist struggle"? At that time, Lin Xiling maintained: The socialism we have now is not true socialism; true socialism should be democratic, but what we have here is not democratic. [Other "hundred flowers" critics cited.] ...Which one of these old problems brought up by "rightists" at that time has been solved? If Old Mao [Zedong] had not come up with a "plot" but rather had welcomed this "bitter medicine," then there would have been no Cultural Revolution, and there also would not have been the democracy movement symbolized by the Tian'anmen Incident [1976] and Xidan Democracy Wall. So trying to restore the rule of the '50s would be like going down a blind alley....

The Cultural Revolution pounded the Party ideologically and organizationally. It is now extremely difficult for this Party to regain the prestige it enjoyed in the past. If the Party's reform wants to carry out effective reforms, it ultimately will have to join forces with the masses' democracy movement. There is no hope of restoring the spirit of the '50s.

Many of us used to be Red Guards. From personal experience we know China's problems and the way to explore and solve these problems. It is true that some of this generation has become "a broken generation." But the rest are truly "a reflective generation," neither believing in gods nor fearing devils. They dare to explore. They have made all sorts of sacrifices for their ideals. Yu Luoke [see Sh 6/7 p. 18] and others were executed; Wei Jingsheng, Wang Xizhe, Liu Qing, Ren Wanding, and others are still in prison. That these far-sighted people were not criminals but national heroes will be the judgment of history.

GUEST: How do you see China's future?

HOST: At the moment we feel disappointed. The enthusiasm that exploded when the "gang of four" fell from power has gradually cooled. But we are optimists. We believe the tide of history is irresistible. The existing state of affairs in China will eventually change. There are three possibilities that will impel change. [Summary: (1) The Party will become more corrupt and there will be a Polish-type uprising to force reforms. (2) The reformers in the Party will prevail.] The third possibility is that the many young intellectuals and sons and daughters of high cadres and, on returning from study abroad, will have gained good experience in other countries and will effect reforms here.

In short, the present state of affairs in China is better than it was in the period of Old Mao and the "gang of four." However, some bureaucrats and privileged elements are rigid, decadent, and incompetent. They will not be able to rectify, arrest, and kill as was done in the past. Hanging up a sheep's head and selling dogmeat [trying to palm off something inferior to that which it is supposed to be] will also fool no one....

GUEST: What hopes have you in the people of Hong Kong?

HOST: We hear that representatives of the Hong Kong University Student [Union] came to Beijing and Guangzhou and expressed support for our struggle for democracy. We are deeply touched by this. We thank them and we thank other compatriots in Hong Kong.

Before long, it will perhaps be our turn to go to prison. We appeal to the university students, young friends, and public in Hong Kong to speak up for us. ✕

LEGEND

< > The first number following the < is the date of original document or (if that is irrelevant or unknown) of broadcast. Second number (if any): U. S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service date. (If no second date is indicated, the two are the same.)
 { } The date (if any) following the { is the date of original document. The number before the } refers to a report of the U. S. Joint Publications Research Service.

A April	HB Hubei Province	PK People's Korea
a August	Heb Hebei Province	PRC People's Rep. of China
AE Asahi Evening News	Hen Henan Province	QH Qinghai Province
AFP Agence France Presse	HK Hong Kong	QN Qishi niandai
AH Anhui Province	HL Heilongjiang Province	R Reuters
AND Asian National Dossier	HN Hunan Province	RB Ribao (daily newspaper)
AP Associated Press	HQ Hongqi (Red Flag)	ROC Rep. of China (Taiwan)
AR Asia Record	HS Hong Kong Standard	S September
ar autonomous region	I January	SC Sichuan Province
Aw Asiaweek	J June	SCM South China Morning Post
AWJ Asian Wall St. Journal	j July	SD Shandong
BJ Beijing (greater Peking)	JL Jilin Province	SH Greater Shanghai
BN Ba-shih nien-tai	JP Japan	Sh SPEAHRhead
BR Beijing Review	JS Jiangsu Province	SK South Korea
C China (People's Rep.)	JT Japan Times	Sn Shaanxi (Shensi) Prov.
c circa	JX Jiangxi Province	SX Shanxi (Shansi) Prov.
CAC Canada Asia Currents	K Kyodo	SS SPEAHR's private sources
CDM Monthly Bulletin Chinese Democratic Movement	KC Korea Communiqué	T Tibet (Xizang) ar
CLG Chinese Law & Gov't	KH Korea Herald	TC Taiwan Communiqué
CP China Post (Taipei)	LN Liaoning Province	TJ Greater Tianjin
CPC Communist Party of China	M March	TK Tokyo
CSM Christian Science Montr.	m May	TW Taiwan
D December	MD Mainichi Daily News	U USSR
DX Dongxiang (HK journal)	MPR Mongolian People's Rep.	UPI United Press Int'l.
FCW Free China Weekly (ROC)	MRK Monthly Rev Korean Afrs	v volume
FEE Far Eastern Econ. Review	N November	WB wan bao
FJ Fujian Province	NK North Korea	WP Washington Post
GD Guangdong Province	NL News & Letters (Detroit)	XH Xinhua/New C News Agency
GM Guangming Daily	NM Nei (Inner) Monggol ar	XJ Xinjiang (Uygur) ar
GS Gansu Province	NX Ningxia (Hui) ar	YN Yunnan Province
GX Guangxi Zhuang ar	NYT New York Times	Y RMB (PRC), yen (Japan)
GZ Guizhou Province	o October	ZJ Zhejiang Province
	PD People's Daily	ZM Zhengming (HK journal)

GUIDE to the UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

See page 2 for complete text.

Arrest, arbitrary	09	Employment	23	Medical care	25	Science	27
Assembly	20	Equality	07	Movement	13	Security of person	03
Association	20	Ex post facto laws	11	Nationality	15	Services, public	21
Asylum	14	Expression	19	Opinion	19	Sexual equality	02
Birth, equality	02	Family	16	Order	28	Slavery	04
Children	25	Food; health care	25	Participation, political	21	Social security (also 25)	22
Cruel punishment	05	Health care	25	Political opinion and equality	02	Standard of living, adequate	25
Cultural rights	27	Honor, attacks on	12	Press	19	Suffrage	21
Defence, right to legal	11	Housing	25	Privacy	12	Thought	18
Degrading treatment	05	Information (receive/transmit)	19	Property (also 02)	17	Torture	05
Detention, arbitrary	09	Innocence, presumption of	11	Racial equality	02	Travel	13
Domicile	13	Legal recognition as person	06	Religion (belief; teaching)	18	Trial, fair	10
Duties	29	Leisure	24	Remedy for rights violation	08	Unemployment security	25
Economic (basic needs)	25	Libel	12	Representative government	21	Unions, trade	23
Education	26	Liberty	03	Reputation, attacks on	12	Violations of rights	08
Elections	21	Limitations on rights (also 30)	29	Residence	13	Women (also 25)	02
		Marriage	16	Salary, fair	23		

BOARD OF DIRECTORS:
SPEAHR (International)

Ch'en Chü (prisoner of
conscience, Taiwan)
René Goldman (Chinese
specialist, University of
British Columbia)
Kawakubo Kimio (economist,
Osaka University)
Miyazaki Shigeki (legal
scholar, Meiji University)
Murakoshi Sueo (Research
Center, Buraku Liberation
League, Japan)

BOARD OF DIRECTORS:
SPEAHR/USA

Henry H. Han (political sci-
entist, Central Michigan
University)
James P. Harrison (historian,
City University of New
York/Hunter College)
Mab Huang (political
scientist, State University
of New York/Oswego)
James D. Seymour (political
scientist, Columbia
University)
Roxane Witke (novelist,
New York)
Jean Woo (consultant,
New York)

BOARD OF ADVISORS

Derk Bodde (historian)
William J Butler (Internation-
al Commission of Jurists)
Chen Ruoxi (author)
Ramsey Clark (lawyer)
James Finn (Freedom House)
Jerrold Fisher
(composer/conductor)
John Israel (historian)
Robert Leuze (opera singer)
George Wald (Nobel laureate
biologist)
William Wipfler (US National
Council of Churches)
Tso Wong (author)

ISSN: 0196-7428.

Back issues available;
write for list.

SPEAHR/USA
P. O. Box 1212
Cathedral Station
New York, NY
10025-1212 USA

(Please do not send
oversized or registered
mail to this address.)

SPEAHRhead is published quarterly by the Society for the Protection of East Asians' Human Rights, a non-partisan international organization which seeks to advance the cause of human rights in China, Taiwan, Mongolia, North and South Korea, and among the Asian ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union.

We view the struggle to promote human rights as virtually synonymous with the struggle to promote non-violence. Our conception of non-violence is a broad one. It is as violent to permit people to starve as it is to torture them. It is as violent to imprison people because of their beliefs as it is to kidnap them for ransom.

We are confident that the best solutions to social and economic problems will emerge from within societies, once the various political groups interact non-violently--i.e., respect each other's human rights.

We are convinced that ruling groups waste much of their nations' resources and human energy when they attempt to eliminate dissent. When a policy is adopted simply because its advocates enjoy the preponderance of force, there is no reason to believe that the policy is more desirable for the people affected than alternative policies would be.

Only when issues are debated by a public with access to a range of ideas and information do we have some reason to hope that the more socially advantageous paths will be followed by those in authority.

Subscription and Membership Information

Donor*: US\$100 per year
Supporting Member*: \$35
Regular Member*: \$16 (two years: \$31)
Additional member (same address, no subscription): \$2
Non-member subscriber: \$12 for 4 quarterly issues (\$23 for 8)
Low income subscriber: \$8

(The \$8 rate is not available to institutions in developed countries, and is not available for more than one year at a time).

ADD \$8 FOR OVERSEAS AIR MAIL.

Funds are urgently needed to carry on our work in support of human rights. Please be as generous as you can. CONTRIBUTIONS ARE TAX-DEDUCTIBLE as provided by U.S. law.

Make U.S.-dollar checks payable to "SPEAHR/USA," and mail to address at lower left. US dollar checks must be payable by a US bank.

FOREIGN CURRENCIES accepted at current exchange rates.
CANADIAN: Make check to SPEAHR/USA. HONG KONG: checks must be made payable to "Citibank a/c 50304402." OTHERS: Add equivalent of US\$14 to cover exchange costs; make payable to SPEAHR/USA.

LIBRARIES: All subscriptions must be prepaid. If invoice is required, please photocopy this page and treat as such. If you cannot prepay, or require additional documentation, please place your order through a subscription service (such as F. W. Faxon Co., Inc., 15 Southwest Park, Westwood MA 02090 USA). If you insist upon further documentation from SPEAHR, there will be a service charge of \$30.

AVAILABILITY IN OTHER MEDIA. This bulletin is available on microfiche from the Inter Documentation Company of Zürich, Switzerland. For further information, write to Human Rights Internet, 1502 Ogden Street NW, Washington DC 20010.

SPEAHRhead is available on 8-inch diskettes (ASCII or Scripsit) for computer use--the most efficient way to retrieve the data. Write SPEAHR for further information.

Selected articles are tape recorded for the benefit of the blind and print-handicapped. Contact "Freedom Ideas International," 640 Bayside, Detroit MI, (313) 842-1804.

REPUBLICATION. Permission to quote or reprint material in SPEAHRhead is granted provided that (1) remarks are not taken out of context in a distorted or unbalanced manner; (2) material has not been copyrighted by a contributing author; and (3) SPEAHRhead is acknowledged as source, with our mail address indicated.